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ABSTRACT
The Impact of t·1onopoly Power on a
Commercial Banking Firm
by
John Atwood Tribble, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah St at e University, l<:l7S
Major Professor: Dr. Kenneth Lyon
Department: Economics
The commercial banking industry is oft en criticized on the grounds
that there is a high concentration of market power in the hands of a
few f irms.

However, the appropriate measure of market power i s Lerner's

index of monopoly power, the elasticit y of demand, not concentration
ratios.

The theoretical model developed in the paper is designed to

permit the estimation of demand and supply el ast icities in. the banking
industry.

Specifically , two assets (loans and s tate and local funds)

and one liability (time deposits) are investigated.
The emp i rical model focuses its attention on the demand and supply
conditi ons.

If the bank i s a profit maximizer , then the banker adjusts

t he portfolio of assets and issues of liahilities in accordance with the
Luler first order maximization conditions of the cxpect e<1 profits
function.

In this func t ion administra tive costs are expressed as a

proporti on of total assets.

Default risks are i gnored . At the optimal

solution of the Eul er firs t order conditions transaction costs generated
by deposi t -liab il ity f luctuations are treated as scalers . These simoli fying assumpt ions permit the estimation of the slope of the loan demand,

viii
of t he demand for state and local funds, and of time deposit suoply,
which can be used to estimate the elasticities of the respective
functions .
The empirical r esults are based on cross-sectional data for 7.89
standard economic areas in those states where there is an absence of
ex t ens ive branch banking.

The ohservations are categorized into eight

bank classes by per capita income level, by hank density per capita in
the standard economic area, and hy economic hase (agricultural or nonagricultural) in the area.

It is assumed that the demand and supply

functions are identical for all banks within a bank class.

llsinr, the

fi r st order maximization conditions as behavioral equations the slopes
of the supply and demand functions are estimated.

These estimates are

used to calculate elasticities of loan demand, state and local funds
demand, and time deposit supply.
In general , it is concluded that those hanks from lm•l income
a rea s have a lower elasticity of demand for loans than banks jn hjgh
income areas.

These banks have more monopoly power in the loan account.

The elast icity of deposit supply is low for all classes of hanks.

This

could be due to monopsony power, but it is more likely due to the legal
ceiling on interest rates paid on time deposits .

The analysis does not

lead to any conclusions for the structural preconditions for the
existence of monopoly power, but it does indicate that banks jn certain
markets may have some degree of monopoly power.
(116 pages)

CHAPTER I
INI'RODOCTJON

The regulation of banks and financial institutions is a phenomenon steeped in the traditions of the west ern worl d .

From the ancient

usury laws enforced by the early church to the government run enterprises of the modern world the banking industry has never been free
from market interference.

Tne interference was justified on moral

grounds, for financial market stability, and eventually for economic
efficiency.
banking:
tition.

Society's regulation has had two opposing influences on

one increasing competition and the other decreasing compeThe essential question of this paper is:

do commercial han!cs

have monopoly power with respect t o loans and monopsony power with
respect to time deposits.
The scope and purpose of the study
l-1arket imperfections may necessitate the regulation of all
financ ial intermediaries.

However, there is one institution that is of

particular importance, the commercial bank.

Commercial bants are dis-

tinctive from all other financial intermediaries i.n that they arc per mitted to accept demand deposits.

The aggregate volume of demand de-

posits exerts a vast impact on all sectors of the economy and is , therefore , a target for government regulations.

P<:JWever, much of this regu-

lation i s designed to enhance competition.

This paper will address it-

self to exigency of regulation to promote economic efficiency in the
commercial banking industry.

The concept of economic efficiency will be treated within the
framework of market imperfections.

Instead of using the traditional

measures of market structure in the banking industry, (concentration
ratios, loan-asset ratios, capital-asset ratios), an attempt will he
made to ascertain whether the existence of monopoly power will cause
banker's to alter their resource allocation.

Monopoly power will he

interpreted in terms of the elasticity of demand for funds from the hank
and the elasticity of supply of funds to the bank.

A model of the

operation of a connnerci al bank will be proposed, which includes the
possibl e existence of monopoly power.

If the bank acts as i f it has

monopoly power, then the conclusion can be drawn that market imperfections do in fact alter the allocation of resources and the distribution of product.
Bank regulations
Under present conditions commercial banks are subject to regulation
from three distinct sources.

First, since the National Bank Act of 186:>

the office of the Comptroller of the Curr.ency has had the power to char~er

qualified institutions as national banks.

The Federal Reserve Act

of 1913 requires all national banks to be members of the Federal Reserve
System and subject to Federal Reserve regulations.

Second, commercial

banks may be chartered by agencies of various state governments, being
regulated by state law, and these banks may choose whether or not to
be members of the Federal Reserve System.

Third, all members of the

Federal Reserve System , whether state or federal charter, have been
obliged to participate with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
since its creation in 1933.

State hanks that are not members of the

3

Federal Reserve System are free to choose not to participate with the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

The banking industry, as a whole,

comes under the regulation of the state banking agencies, the Federal
Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
From these three sources of regulation there arise four potential
areas 1vhere competition or economic efficiency may he diminished. 1
First, there may be a restriction of bank entry into the industry .

The

Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935, in the waJc.e of monetary panic and concern
with the problem of "over-banking," empowered the Comptroller of the
Currency when considering any new charters to certify that he has
examined the bank's
future earning prospects ... the convenience and needs of
the community to be served by the bank.z
The Federal Reserve Sys tem and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Here given the same guidelines Hhen accepting nelV memhers or issuing
insurance to new banks.

The policy, as stated, was to overtly restrict

entry if neH firms would dampen the earnings prospects for firms already
in the industry.
Second, various state laws prohibit or restrict branch hanking.
As of 1970 there are nineteen states that permit state-wide branch
hanking.

There are sixteen states where limited area hranch

prevails.

In the remaining fifteen states only unit hanking

hnnkinJ~

1This r ationale is described in Richard H. Timherlake and Fdward
B. Selby , Money and Banking (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Publishinr, Company,
Inc., 1972), pp. 207-224.

4

i s permitted. 3 The law varies from state to state and the practice
varies even mre widely.

Prohibitions of branch banking restricts

competition and may permit the creation of local monopolies .

nn

the

other hand, the existence branch banking allows the growth of banking
giant s who by their mere size may inhibit competition . 4
Third, there are a variety of limitations placed on earning
assets .

"Country" banks are subject to one set of reserve requirements,

"reserve city" another, and state chartered banks still other sets.
Assets are restricted according to the size of the capital accolmt under
state law or under Regulation H of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve Systern. 5
Finally, there are a variety of limitations placed on interest
rate payments.

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

uses Regulation Q to put a ceiling on rates of interest paid on
deposits .

State agencies administer various usury laws wh.ich

interest charged on loans.

ti~e

l~it

Both price restrictions and auantity re-

strictions may affect the degree of competition.
The net effect of the extensive regulation of the financial
sector is difficult to judge. Clearly, there are various
desirable social goals that the regulations are desigr.ed
to further. Unfortunately, there are also cos t s associated
with these regulations.
There seems to be mounting

Sunm7u

3Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
of Accounts and
Deposits in i\11 Commercial Banks, National Swnmary une 30, 1970
(washington, D.C.: f.ederal Deposit Insurance Corporation , 1970), p. 8 .
4·rnis paper will not address the branch banking controversy
specificall y. J\ deta iled discussion of the problem is given in Paul
M. llorvi t z and Bernard Shull, "The Impact of Branch Banking on Banking Performance," National Banking Review, 2 (December, 1964),
143-88.
5
Cf. Chapter IV, p. 60 .

evidence that the net effect of regulation has been to
create and sus ta i n monopoly positions r ather than pro tect the consumers or the financial system.6
Recommendations of the rrunt Commission
Given this structure of extensive regulation from almost all
levels of government, with its dubious impact on competition and economic
efficiency , in 1970 President Nixon establ i shed the President's Commission
on Financial Structure and Regulation, later known as the !-runt Commission.
The purpose of the commission was to study the operations, regulations,
and structure of all private financial institutions in the llnited States
and to propose a series of recommendations that would improve their performance.

The following is a list of recornnendations that pertain par -

ticularly to competition.
The commission recommends:

(1)

that a ll controls on interest

rates paid on non-demand deposits be abolished (except on a standby
basis for a period of ten years);

(2) that financial institutions should

not be allowed to pay interest on demand deposits;

(3) that portfolio

r estrictions on financial institutions be substantially reduced;

(4)

that savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks he permitted
to issue demand depos it s and a wider range of liabilities;

(5)

that

state laws be changed to encourage statewide branching of all financial
institutions;

(6)

that rates on government guaranteed loans (particularly mortgages) be determined by market forces . 7
6rhomas R. Saving, "Toward a More Competitive Financial Sectors,"
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 4 (November 1972), 897.
7The Re
Structure
and Regulation
rmtmg
Off1ce, 1971).

6

All of these recommendations were designed to enhance competition.
Fir st, removing all deposit rate restrictions should reduce disintermediation from one group of financial institutions to another
general l evel of interest rates change.

1~hen

the

This means that all institu-

tions will compete for deposits on an equal basis.

The second recom-

mendation is for the purpose of insuring that the needs of the small
depositor are met.

If interest payments were allowed on demand de-

posits a number of the services now available to small depositors would
disappear.

The third recommendation gives the bank or other financial

institution a higher degree of autonomy in managing its own portfolio .
In particular, savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks are
permitted to purchase a wider range of assets, theoretically reducing
the amount of risk in their entire portfolio.

Also recommended is the

elimination of geographical restrictions on the residence of borrowers,
which were designed to insure that local funds were loaned locally.
lhe fourth recommendation, permitting savings and loan associations and
mutual saving s banks to issue dell'.and deposits, puts the se institutions
in direct competition with commercial banks.

The fifth recommendation

concludes that branch banking enhances competition, instead of diminishing it.

Finally, the sixth recommendation, which would remove the ceil-

ing rates on mortgages, will increase mobility of resources in and out
of the mortgage market.

The increased liquidity will improve efficiency

in the financial sector and reduce the gap between lending and borrowing
rates of all financial institutions. 8
8James To hi n, "A c:eneral l'quil ibrium Approach to JV!onetary "lheory ,'"
.Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking , l (February, 1969), ZR-29 .

7

This i s a "set" of recommendations which taken as a 1'>1lole are
designed to increase competition.

Collectively they would tend to cause

the variety of distinc t ive f inancial institutions to

beco~e ~ore

similar.

The essential legal differences between commercial bank, savings and loan
associations , and mutual savings banks would be eliminated , thus increas ing the total number of po tential competitors in each market.
Outline of procedures
If under the present form of hank regulation there are restrictions on the degr ee of compet i tion, this should he exhibited in the
marke t behavior of commercial banks .

In particular, it wi l l he r eflected

in the el as tic ity of demand for funds from the banks.

Chapter II will

discuss the various measures of monopoly power and their application in
banking markets .

The chapter will also review the literat ure of banking

theory and the empirical evidence of bank behavior with particular emphasis on models that affect the s tructure of the banking industry .
Chapter III builds a detailed theoretical model of a commercial
bank, based on the review of the literature.

This model recognizes

the possible exis tence of monopoly power, but it is compatible with perfectly compet itive markets, as well.

An empirical model derived ·f rom

the theor etical model is proposed in Chapter IV .
rrovides a testable hypothesi s:
have monopo ly power.

The emnirica l model

that commercial banks ac t as if they

Chapter V will empirically t es t whe t her hanks act

as if t hei r l oan demand and deposit supply functions are less than perfectly elas tic .
conclus i ons .

Chapter VI summarizes the results and presents the

8

CHAJYI'ER II
REVIEW OF TilE LITERA'IURJ' ON Cct-fv!ERCIAL
BANKING AND MONOPOLY POWFR

The literature on commercial bank portfolio determination is wide
rangi ng and extensive.

This review will be limited to those items that

are of particular :iJnportance to this study.

The review is intended to

provide the foundation for the development of a theoretical model of commercial bank behavior.

It is divided into five sections:

cept of monopoly power;
theories of banking;

(2) traditional banking theories;

(1)

the con -

(3) monopoly

(4) empirical evidence of banking monopolies; and

(5) literature on the appropriate

tL~e

horizon.

Monopoly power
~1onopoly

power is the conceptualization of the idea that a busines s

may have the capabili ty of distorting the allocation of resources from
their most economically efficient employment, whether that power is exercised or not.

It is conmon usage to refer to the "degree of monopoly"

as a recognition that monopoly power is being exercised. 9 Strictly
speaking, a monopoly exists 1vhenever one firm is the only seller in a
well-defined market of a well -defined product.

Industries in which

there are few competitors are said to exhibit some degree of monopoly.
lnis implies, that while monopoly in the strict sense does not exist ,
9Fritz Machlup, The Political Economy of Monopo l y (Baltimore :
'Inc John Hopkins Press , 1952), pp. 469-528.

9

the fi rms are capable of distorting the allocation of resources.
monopoly power nor degree of monopoly can be measured directly.

Neither
Since

they are merely the conceptualization of an idea it is difficult to
assign a number to measure t heir relative intensities.
proxies have been suggested .

A number of

These tend to fall into two classes:

(1)

those that are derived from the cause or structure of monopoly (numbers,
concentrations, company and plant divergences); and (2) those that are
derived from the effects of the existence of monopoly (rates of profit,
price-inflexibility, marginal cost and price differentials , cross
elasticities of demand).
The most obvious approach for measuring monopoly would be to count
the number of firms in the industry.

rbwever, this approach quickly

breaks dmvn due to the difficulty in defining the market.

This would be

particularly true in the banking industry, where the number of firms in
the nation or in the state may be large, but the larger por tion of the
deposits is controlled by only a few firms .

The alternative is to

measure the degree of monopoly by the concentration in the industry.
'[hat is the proportion of output controlled by the largest firm or the
first four largest firms.

But this measure is questionable, also, since

the number of firms in the nation may be large and each firm relatively
small, but each firm caters to a small well -defined market.

Within this

market each banking firm could have a great deal of monopoly pmver and
market control, even though the concentration ratio for the industry as a
~~o l e

is low.

Another problem with concentration ratios is that firms

do not produce a single product; instead they produce a variety of products.

The firm has to be classified in one industry or another accord-

ing to their major product and won't be counted in other industries in

10

which they participate.

10

The use of concentTation ratios as a measure

of degree of monopoly power in the banking industyY does not appear to
be pTOmising.
It is often argued that the most obvious result of monopoly is
abnormally high profits, and attempts have been made to measure the
11
degree of monopoly power in tenns of rates of profits .
It is recognized that accounting profits are subject to many spurious influences,
but Bain aruges that profits may be adjusted to a comparable rate.

The

"theoretical rate" would adjust profits and value of "necessaTY net
assets" to arrive at a rate which could be compared with competitive
rates of profit as an indication of monopoly power.

However, the ad-

justment process 1vould be quHe cl.Dnbersome, and the measure is still
plagued with some theoretical considerations.

For instance, an aunormal

adjusted rate of profit might be the result of nonnal returns on investmentor of abnonnal returns on "necessary investment." There is no way
to distinguish between the two.
Another phenomenon of imperfect competition that might be used to
measure monopoly power is price inflexibility. 12 Noting that administered prices change only infrequently, it is argued that if an industyY
j s

able to stabilize its prices for long periods of time, it is appar-

cntly in" monopolistic position.

l'articulurly Juring the llepression
Concentration of
. tates (Qvernment

11
Joe S. Bain, "The Profit Rate as a ~Ieasure of Monopoly Power,"
quarterly Journal of Economics, 55 (1941), 271-93.
12
John T. Dunlop, "Price Flexibility and the 'Degree of Monopoly',"
quarterly Journal of Economics, 47 (1939), 522-33.

11

years, those industries whose prices were insensitive to the downward
pressure of severe recession appeared to exhibit monopoly power.

A

serious defect of this measure is that it fails to account for the possibility of cost inflexibility.

Margin flexibility is a measure of price

flexibility net of variations in direct costs of production.

Dunlop com-

pares on a percentage basis price changes with changes in direct cost ,
implying that the ratio of price changes to changes in direct cost
yields a measure of price flexibility which can be used to measure the
degree of monopoly.

While price inflexibility appears to be a phenome-

non associated with monopoly, its existence is merely a theoretical
proposition, not a direct result of monopoly.

Under certain conditions

of constant marginal costs for the monopolist this proposition may hecome a result, but one has no grounds for a;suming constant marginal
cost.

In addition, measuring monopoly power in terms of price inflexi-

bility ignores differences in the variability of demand over time.
Some monopolist may experience unstable market demands and may therefore
appear to have relatively high price flexibility, even though they are
faced with dowmvard sloping demand curves.
Abba Lerner proceeds directly from the theory of monopoly to a
measure of the degree of monopoly power. 13 Since the monopolist is
faced with a downward sloping demand curve price will not be equal to
111arginaJ cost at the profit maximizing level of output.

The relative

gap between marginal cost and selling price wi ll he a measure of
monopoly power:
13Abba P. Lerner, "The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of
Monopoly Power," Review of Economic Studies, 1 (1934), 157-175.

12

Lerner
index

p

p

M:::

If the price is equal to marginal cost the index is equal to zero and
there is perfect competition .

The larger the gap between price and

marginal cost the closer the index is to one and the greater the degree
of monopoly power .

Lerner's index bears a close relationship to the

elasticity of demand at the profit maximizing output, where marginal
cost is equal to margina l revenue:
elasticity
of
demand

p

AR
AR - MR

p - f't:

(Lerner index)- l
The implicat ion is that the less elastic the demand curve the greater
the degree of monopoly power for the profit maximizing fi rm.
Another attempt to measure monopoly directly from the demand cur ves
was made by K. 1"1 . Rothsch ild . 14 He compares the s lope of the demand
curve for the firm with the slope of the demand curve for the indust ry.
lne firm ' s demand curve is defined for this purpose as that pert aining
when all competing fi rms change prices.

The ratio of th e s lope of the

finn ' s demand to the slope of the industry' s demand curve is an index
of monopoly power .

If the ratio is equal to one the firm controls the

entire market and is a pure monopolist .

The more perfectly competitive

14
K. W. Rothschild, "The Degree of Monopoly,"
24-39.

Economica, 9 (1942),

13
the finn the closer the ratio approaches zero.

Comparing his measure

with Lerner ' s , Roth schild notes that Lerner's index
i s probably the ideal measure if we want to deal with problems
like social cos t of monopoly, the allocation of r esources
under monopoly , the divergence from optimum output, and similar
que s tions .l 5
Rothschild 's fonnula gives a better indication of potential monopoly
power of a finn over an industry.

The major weakness of Rothschild's

proposal arises when there is competition from similar products outside
of the :indus t ry definition.

Here his industry demand curve does not

indicate total consumer demand.
Robe rt Triffin approaches thi s particular problem i n t erms of the
cross el ast icities of demand. 16 If the firm is a pure monopoly, then
the cross-el ast icity of demand between its product and the products of
all other finns i s zero.

This concept is theoretically appealing, but

it runs into problems of prac tical application, because cross-elasticities of products of different

fi~s

cannot be aggregated into a single

index.
For the purposes of this paper the most appropriate measure of
the degree of monopoly i s the Lerner index.

This will prove empiri-

cally des irable , as well as , the best theoretical measure available.
Care has to be taken to avoid overextending the concept of monopol y
power wjth the Lerner model.

Price Theory texts point out the follow -

ing problem:
15
16

Ibid., pp. 33-34 .

Robert Triffin , Mono
(Cambridge, Mass .: J-larv~a~r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

14
Another common misconception is that the demand curve faced
by a monopolist is inelastic. Most demand curves, with the
exception of those faced by firms under conditions of pure
competition, range from highly elastic toward their upper
The
ends to highly inelastic toward their lower ends.
output that maximizes a monopolist's profits will always be
within the elastic sector of his demand curve if he has any
costs of pcoduction . Marginal cost is always positive;
therefore, at the output at which marginal cost equals
marginal revenue, marginal revenue must also be positive.l7
If the monopolist is faced with an upward shifting marginal cost curve,
he will reduce his output and raise his price, moving up his demand
curve.

In moving from one profit maximizing output to another , the

elasticity of demand may rise and the Lerner index of monopoly power
falls.

As the firm moves up its demand curve price rises at a slower

rate than marginal cost (assuming that the firm is maintaining the
profit maximizing output) and the relative gap between marginal cost
and price is falling.

Even though the monopolist is charging a higher

price and selling a smaller output the degree of monopoly, as measured
by the Lerner index, has fallen.
ties reflect only the rising

The higher prices and smaller quanti-

cost structure.

Despite this criticism

the Lerner index is the best available measure of monopoly power.
Traditional banking theories
A commercial bank's basic function i s to act as a financial intermediary.

As such, it purchases securities from "ultimate harrowers"

anti issues indirect debt for the portfolios of "ultimate l enders."

·nlC bank participates in two distinct markets: a market for primary
securities and a market for indirect debt.

The essential que stions

17Richard H. Leftwich, The Price System and Resource Allocation,
Sth ed. (Hinsdale, Ill.: The Dryden Press, 1973), pp. 234-235.

15
which a connnercial bank has to ans1ver are:

how much indirect debt

should it is sue and how much of each type of security should it purchase?
F. Y. Edgeworth answers that last question by assuming that the
banker is playing a game of chance:
Probability is the foundation of banking. The solvency and
profits of the banker depend upon the probability that he
will not be called upon to meet at once more than a certain
amount of his liabilities ....
I have imagined a new game of chance, which is ]ilayed in
this manner: each player receives a disposable fund of 100
counters , part of which he may invest in securities not
immediately realisable, bearing say 5 per cent. per ten minutes ; another portion of the 100 may be held at call, bearing
interest at 2 per cent . per ten minutes; the remainder is
kept in the hands of the player as a reserve against certain
liabilities . The demand which he has to meet is thus regulated . From time to time, say every two minutes , there is
taken a certain number, say 22, digits at random from the pages
of some mathematical or statistical table. The sum of these
digits constitutes the demand which the player must meet. We
need not consid er the provision which is made to meet the
average amount (99) of the demand . The special object of the
re serve above mentioned is to provide against demands which exceed the average. If the player can meet this excess demand
with his funds in hand, well; but if not he must call in part,
or all , of the sum placed at call, incurring a forfeit of
10 per cent. on the amount called in. But if the demand is so
great that he cannot even thus meet it, then he incurs an
The player who
enormous forfeit, say 100 1. or 1000 1 .
IVins the most interest IVins the game.l7
TI1eories of bank portfolio management based on deposit-liability
f luctuations have been refined, but they are still based on the same
principles.

The forfeiture s can be thought of as transaction costs:

brokerage costs, penalty payments, possible loss of principle.

Bank

portfolio model s have been developed on the basis or di rrering
17 F. Y. EdgeiVorth, "The Mathematical Theory of Banking," Journal
of the Royal Stati stical Society, 51 (March 1888), 113 , 120 .
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transaction costs bei ng associated with different assets yielding
different returns.

One such model was developed by Kenneth Lyon. 18

Considering three types of assets:

loans, securities, and case, A ,A 2 ,
1
and A3 , respectively, with rates of return i and i 2 (i =0) and trans3
1
action costs t 1 and t 2 (t 3=0) associated with each asset. The expected
profits f unction is the interest earned on each asset if the asset is
in the portfolio for the full time period minus the interest lost times
the percent of the time the asset is expected to be absent from the
portfolio minus the expected transaction costs incurred in moving the
asset in and out of the portfoli o.
E(P)

E(interest earned)

E(interest lost)
(1)

- E(transaction costs)
where E is the expectations operator.

Letting y (with a ·density f(y))

be the random variability of deposits, the probability that some loan
assets will not be in the portfolio is:
A
1
J (A - y) f(y) dy
0
1

1ne probability that some security assets will not be in the portfolio
is:

18 Kenneth Lyon, "'lneory of Commercial Bank Portfolio Selection:
'111e Simp! Hied Model," Utah State llniversi ty, unpublished paper.
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The probability that all of the security assets are out of the portfolio
is:
A
J 1f(y) dy

0

These probabilities may be interpreted as the percent of the time the
assets arc not in the portfolio.

1nerefore, the expected interest

loss may be expressed as the interest rate times the percent of the

time assets are expected to be out of the portfolio.
Transaction costs are incurred whenever the level of assets
changes, either up or down; "whenever a level of assets below
follm;ed by a level of assets above

Z"

19

or vice versa .

Z is

Therefore,

the probability of transacting the Zth asset is the joint probability
of the two events:

g(Z)

z
J

f(y) dy

0

J

z

f(y) dy

(2)

The expected profits function is:
E(P)

Al
izA 2 J f(y)dy
0

Al
f (Z) tlZ
-tl J
()

19

Ibid., p. 7.

Al+Az
g (Z) tl Z
t2 J
Al

(3)
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Profits are maximized with respect to the three assets and the portfolio
is allocated in accordance with the first order Euler maximization conditions.

The determination of the portfolio is dependent on the random

variability of deposits, the rates of interest received on loans and
securities, and the transaction costs of loans and securities.
Another approach to bank portfolio management is centered around
the assumption that operating cost differentials are the most significant var iable.

The cost associated with the "output" of each type of

product and with the "input" of each type of resource will detennine
the banks holdings of assets and liabilities.

The most difficult problem

associated with this approach is in defining output:
In defining variables , there appears to be fair ly general agreement on the relevance of current operating expense - as shown
in Income and Dividend Statements - as a measur e of cost.
However , no similar consensus exists with re spec t to output
definition. Measures used include total deposits, total assets,
earning assets, number of loans and deposit accounts, and
synthetic indexes.20
George Benston has been the leading researcher in marginal costs
associated with banking output.

llis approach to the output defini tion

is described as follows:
For many problems of economic analyses, it is useful to think
of the amount of loans and investments as product sold, the
amount of deposits as a factor of production, and the amount
of operations expenses as a cost of production. However , a
better measure of bank output for study of the costs of hanking operations [my underline] 1s the number of depos1t
accounts and loans processed.
20 stuart Greenbaum , "Costs and Production in Commercial Banking,"
Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, ~~rch
Aprll, 1966), 13.
~bn thl y
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The "work" of a bank consists of transfering funds on
demand, holding and investing funds for time depositors, and
making l oans and investments. The operations costs incurred
are a function of the services performed. Since these services are related primarily to the number of deposit account
and loans processed rather than dollars loaned, economies-ofscale should be measured against this concept of output.21
Costs depend on the output mix:

the cost of "producing" demand

deposits, time deposits , mortgage loans, installment loans, business
loans , and securities.

Many of these costs are jointly dependent,

since the "number" of assets may also affect the ''number" of liabilities.
Benston's statistical estimates indicate that the marginal cost curves
for mortgage loans slopes upwards at a decreasing rate; the installment
loan curve is U-shaped, and the business loan curve is downward sloping.

He observes that this is consistent with studies indicating that

larger banks tend to have a lower proportion of real estate and installment loans-to-total loans and investments, and that for smaller banks
the proportion of business loans-to- total loans and investments is
lower.

On the liability side, the marginal cost curve associated with

demand deposi t s is downward sloping and with time deposits the cost
curves are flat.

This is consistent with general observations that

larger banks tend to issue a larger proportion of demand deposits than
time deposits. 22 • 23
A third approach to bank portfolio management is to assume that
each bank determines its optimal portfolio in accordance with
21 George J. Benston , "Economies of Scale and Marginal Costs in
Banking Operations," The National Banking Review, 2 (June 1965), 513.
22
Ibid., p . 544.
23 Bcnston has recentl y updated and refined his original work appl ying it to savings institutions. "Savings Banking and the Public Interes t," Journal of Money, Credit , and Banking, 4 (February, 1972), 133-224.
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regulation and requirements administered by bank examiners. 24

It is

assumed that each bank knows the volumes of demand and time deposits,
rates of interest , and the banks net worth.
with two basic restrictions:
folios."

The banker is concerned

reserve requirements and ''balanced port-

1he "balanced portfolio" is def ined in terms of "rules-of-

thumb" used by bank examiner s, i.e., upper limits on the ratio of debt
to net worth , or of total assets to net worth.

Bank examiners establish

a "leverage" function , which is a linear combination of primary and
secondary reserve, minimum risk assets, intermediate assets, and port folio assets (and subsets of these).

The "leverage" functions become

a constraint, or more specifically a series of constraints, defined in
tenns of the asset variables.

The banker maximizes profits subject to

these constraints over a five-year period time horizon.

This linear

progrannning problem yields the optimal amount of each asset to be held
in the portfolio.

Chambers and Charnes have provided a tool for

"optimal" portfolio decision making based upon the responsiveness of
the bankers to bank examiners ' guidelines, but their analysis does not
25
answer the question of whether bankers actually behave in this way.
A commercial bank, like all intermediaries, is faced with the
problem of what kinds of

a; sets

it is t o hold in its portfolio and what

combinations of debt issues it is to maintain.

II variety of theories

have been advanced on the basj s of portrolio diversification.

Edgeworth 1 s and Lyon 1 s models are founded on risk and transaction costs.
24 u. Chambers and A. Charnes, "Inter-Temporal Analysis and
Optimization of Bank Portfolios," Management Science , 7 (July 1961):
393-410.
25 Ibid.
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Benston' s model of marginal cost is based on the imperfect divisibility
of assets (with output measured in number of accounts , instead of
dollars) .

Chamber's and Charnes' model is based on the non-financial

aspec ts of the portfolio, as they try to conform to bank examiners
guidelines.

It will be a major contention of this paper that a model

based on price discriminating monopoly power is also of interest .
Monopol y theories of banking
With limitations placed on entry into the banking industry and
restrictions on the establishment of branch banks one would expect that
the industry would be characterized by some degree of monopoly .

Inst ead

of f acing perfectl y elastic demand curves of perfect competition, banks
appear t o be faced with downward sloping demand curves:
Individual banks also pos sess a degree of freedom in determining the interest rates to be charges on their loans to
customers. To each bank the demand curve for its loans does
not appear to be a horizontal line at t he "ruling" market rate
... an increase in the bank's rate will not lead to a complet e
di sappearance of the demand for its loans any more than a
reduction of its rate will bring to it an infinite demand . 26
Based on the number of alternatives that potential borrowers in a
particular market have available to them , a commercial bank may find
that its demand curve for a particular type of loan may he downward
s loping.

Bernard Shull and Paul llorvitz in a comparative study of

bank i ng structure defined the appropriate markets as local markets
26
Lester V. Chandler, 'Monopolistic Elements in Commercial
Banking," Journal of Political Economy, 46 (February, 1938), 4.
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because for the vast majority of banks and bank-borrowers
and depositors, nei ther the entire United States nor the
individual st ate represent realistic geographic ~7kets.
The bank business is principally local in nature.
Within these local banking markets they conclude that concentration
ratios are high.

However, high concentration ratios are not a suf-

fic ient condition for t he exi stence of monopoly.

Monopoly power implies

that firms in the industry have demand curves that are less than i nf i nitely elastic.
A monopoly banking model was proposed by Bernard Shul l.

He des-

cribes a commercial bank as a multiple-product pr ice discriminating
monopolist. 28 The exposition of this model i s conducted under conditions of absolute certainty.
(1)

The fo l lowing assumptions are made:

there are three types of assets (business loans, residential

mor t gages , and government securities);

(2)

the marginal cost of pro-

clueing each of these assets is identical (marginal costs are i ndependent
of the composition of the portfolio);

(3)

there are no required re-

serves and no borrowed reserves ;

(4)

there i s no risk of default on

any of the three types of loans;

(5)

there are no fluctuations in

deposit- liabilities creating unforeseen demands for reserves;

(6)

there are no transaction cos t s in the purchase of any of the assets;
27
Bernard Shull and Paul M. Horvitz, "Branch Banking and the
Structure of Competi tion," The National Banking Review, 1 (1-farch 1964),
303.
28 Bernard Shul.l, "Corroncrcial Banks as Multiple-Product Price
lliscrimina ting Firms," in Banking arid Monetary Studies, ed . Deane
Carson (Homewood, Ill.: lhchard D. Jrwm, Inc., 1963), pp. 351-368 .
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(7) the bank will maximize the change in net worth within a specified
time horizon; and

(8)

in lieu of risks, there exists barriers to

entry and prevention of relending that enable the banking firm to be
a price discriminator.
The bank, beginning in a position with no earning assets i n its
portfolio, will make the loan that brings in the greatest amount of
revenue.

If ordering the loans shows the marginal revenue associated

with the first unit of business loans to be greater than the marginal
revenue of the first units of resident i al nnrtgages or government
securities, then the bank will enter the market for business loans
first.

TI1e bank will expand its business loans until the marginal

revenue on business loans falls below the marginal revenue associated
with the first units of residential mortgage loans.

Assuming yields

on some of the latter exceed the yield on government securities, the
bank will then increase its holdings of both assets keeping their
declining marginal revenues equal.

This expansion of assets will

con~

tinue as long as marginal costs are below marginal revenue.
Eventually, the marginal revenues associated with business loans
and residential mortgages will decline to the level of the marginal
revenue on government securities.

1ne demand for government securities

from this commercial bank may be perfectly elastic.

If this is the

case, the marginal revenue will remain constant as the bank expands i ts
purchases of these securities until the marginal revenue is equal to
marginal cost.

Once the bank begins the purchase of government secur-

ities, it will not m:;kc any more business loans or mortgap,e loans,

24
since this would involve mar ginal revenues lower than could be gained
in the government securities market.
Figure 1 graphically depicts Shull's model.
profit maximization (HRm.

= ~1Rm =

1

MRGS

= ~1C)

If it is assumed that

defines a stable equil-

ibrium for the banks portfolio, then the bank will hold Oa of its
assets in business loans,
government securities.

ab

in residential mortgages, and he in

(All of its assets are earning assets.)

The

interest rates charged on all three types of loans are defined as their
average revenues, iBL' iRW and iGS' respectively .

The existence of

downward sloping demand (i.e., monopoly power) is sufficient to cause
a bank to diversify its portfolio.
Shull 's model considers the commercial bank as a price discriminating monopolist, who restricts certain credit lines by charging higher
prices.

A number of models have been ' proposed, which consider those

banks with monopoly power to be non-price credit rationers.
and

~1odigl

Jaffee

iani argue that, under certain circumstances, it may be

rational for a bank to be a complete price discriminator, charging
each customer a different price, but that in the banking system of the
United States the necessary conditions are not met. 29 Tnstead, at the
ceiling rate of interest the bank's demand for loans may be greater
than the bank is willing to offer .

The bank will have to ration credit

among its cus tomers.
In the presence of risk as to the outcome of the loan, reducing the si zc of the loan \vi ll increase the expected return, hy
reducing the expected loss from insolvency of the fh111. It i s ,
29
0\vight Jaffee and Franco Modigliani, "A Theory and Test of
Credit Rationing," American Economic Review, 59 (December 1969) , 850-871.
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rate

iBL
iRK

MC

iGS

Figure 1.

The multiple-product price discriminating bank.

therefore, quite understandable that a bank faced with a
higher opportunity cost (whether from a rise in the market
rate or in lending opportunities) and unable to raise the
return by raising rates, will find it profitable to r aise its
return at least by upgrading the quality of its portfolio
through a reduction of risk; the upgrading may take the form
of shifting funds toward less risky customgrs, and/or of
reducing loans made to the same customer.3
This analysis depends crucially upon the concept of default risk and
upward limitations (non-market) on rates of interest.

In the absence of

default risk it would be irrational for a banker to use non-price credit
rationing.

In the presence of default risk and interest rate limi-

tations the banker would not become a price discriminator of the
30

Ibid., p. 865.
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first degree.
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According to Jaffee and ~lod igl iani, it would be ir-

rational for the banker to attempt to capture all the consumer surplus.
Instead, the banker will classify his customers into specific groups,
charging the same price within the group, but different prices to different groups.

fn the presence of default risk the banker will use

methods of non-price rationing to limit credit within a group, while
credit is still rationed with price differentials between groups.
This is not first degree price discrimination as described by Pigou,
but it is akin to the mult1ple-product price discrimination described
32
by Eli Clemens,
on which Shull bases his model. Shull 's model is proposed in a risk f ree wor ld and would under those assumptions be consistent with Jaffee and Modigliani's model with the introduction of risk.
Fmpi rical evidence of
bank1ng monopol1es
Franklin Frlwards, proceeding from the idea of limited borrower
alternatives for small business firms , attempts to test two hypotheses:
(1) that, ce teris paribus, the level of business loan rates
is higher 1n markets hav1ng relatively high concentration;
and (2) that, ceteris paribus, business loan rates are less
flexible in markets fiav1ng relative l y high concentration.33
Using a sample of forty- nine Standard Metropolitan Areas (SMA) as
consti tuting the appropriate markets and measuring concentration by
31 1\ . C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, 4th ed., (London:
fvlacMillan, 1932), Chapter 17.
32 m i Clemens, "Price Discrimination and the ~~Jltiple-l'roduct
irm," Review of Economic Studies 1.9(1950-Sl), 1-11.
33 Frankl in IL Edwards, "Concentration in Banking and Tts Fffect
on Bus iness Loan Rates," Review of Economics and Statistics, 46
(August 1964) , 294 .
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the percentage of deposits held by the three largest banks in each 9-1A ,
Edwards draws the following inferences:
concentration in banking markets should not be permitted to
increase because of its adverse affect on price competition;
... since high concentration is associated with rigid
price behavior , a more concentrated banking structure would make
more difficul t certain monetary policy objectives; and since
increasing concentration would probably raise rates charged
sma ll borrowers, by more in relation to rates charged large
borro~o1ers, the r esult might be discriminatory reallocation
of funds from small to large borrowers.34
In a study by George Kaufman based on observations of individual
banks in the state of Iowa the structure of the banking industry is
related to the "performance" of the banks. 35
possible measures of bank "performance":

(l)

Kaufman suggests five
gross interest rate

charged on loans and (2) interest rat e paid on time and savings de posits (price measures);

the ratio of loans to total assets and

(3)

(4)

the ratio of time deposi t s to total deposits (activity measures);

and

(5)

assets.

net current before tax earnings as a percentage of total
He r el ates these performance variables to three indicators

of market structure and to five factors effecting market demand.
three st ructural variabl es are:

(l)

the ratio of total savings and

loan associa tions assets to total commercial bank deposits;
dis tance from the nearest major financial center; and
number of banks or a concentration ratio.

population growth;
34
35

(3)

(3)

(7.)

the

either the

1he five factors of demand

that are incorporated into the analysis are:
(2)

1he

(l)

median family income;

population size;
(4)

growth of

Jbid.' p. 300 .

ccorgc C. Kat1fman, "R'lnk Market Struc ture and l'crfoTITlr'lnce: The
Evi dence from Iowa ," Southern Economic Journal, 32 (August 1964), 42>J439 .
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fam il y income; and
employment.

(5)

ratio of nonagricultural employment to total

Based on regressions of the structural and demand variables

on the performance variables, Kaufman concludes:
The greater was the number of banks or the lower was the
percentage of deposits held by the largest bank , the l ower
were effective rates charged on loans, the higher were
interest rates paid on time deposits and the greater was
the ratio of time deposits to total deposits. In addition,
the greater was bank concentration, the greater were pretax
earnings on assets.36
Shull's model has not, as yet, been subjected to a rigorous empirical test.

He points out that casual observation of the behavioral

characteristics of the banking industry is consistent with the theory,
but this does not constitute a rigorous test.

~bwever,

some attempts

have been mad e to utilize this theory in estimating the monopoly of a
commercia l bank. 37 Eric Brucker uses the analysis to calculate the
el asticity of demand for loans.

Assuming that the government securities

market i s perfectly competitive (ARGS

= ~1RG ),

5

he uses the fac t that

marginal revenues of all the assets will be the same to estimate the
elas ticities of demand:

( 4)

ARIlL -ARGS
36 rbid., p. 438.
37 Eric Brucker, "II Microeconomic Approach to Banking Competition,"
Journal of Finance, Vol. 25, (December, 1970), 1133-1141.
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Having estimated the elasticities on the basis of interest rate observations, Brucker compares the use of the loan-asset ratio and the
elasticity of demand as measures of monopoly power and he finds that the
elasticity of demand measure is far superior.

The general argument with

regard to the loan-asset ratios is that those banks which hold a high
percentage of their loan portfolio in a highly competitive loan class
would be less competitive, since they are restricting their l oans in
the noncompetitive class.

Beth Kaufman and Fdwards use loan-asset
ratios as an activity indicator of monopoly power. 38 In a doctoral
dissertation Michael Klein tests a recursive model of choice in determining the loan-asset ratio. 39 His approach follows t he analysis of
Shull and indicates that price differences between loans and other
assets (government securities) may depend on the elasticit y of suppl y
of the primary security to the bank.

Although Klein's model is not

derived directly from Shull's, his conclusions lend support to the contention that monopoly power is an important determinant of a commercial
bank's portfolio.
Literature on the appropriate
t1me hor1Zon
lne three empirical studies cited do not consider the profit maximizing motives of the bank .
of demand.

Instead they look only at the conditions

In order to consider the bank as a profit maximizer it is

necessary to know over what period of time the banker bases his
deci sions .

The theoretical model of this paper outlines three distinct

38
Franklin Edwards, "Concentration in Banking , " and George
Kaufman, "Bank ~1arket Structure."
39
~1i chael A. Klein, "Differential Commercial Rank Portfolio
Allocabon" (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1968).
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planning horizons:

(l)

an annual period over

its portfolio to maximize profits;

(2)

~Vhich

the bank adjusts

an intermediate time period

during which the bank is able to adjust some of its assets to conform
to

cl~nging

market conditions;

(3)

and the short run period \Vhere the

bank is subj ec t to random variations beyond its own control.
Problems arise
operations.
differs .

~Vi th

the optimal time planning horizon for banking

The reaction time for different types of situations

For instance , a change in general market conditions may affect

the demand for loanable funds from the bank, but several months may be
required for the bank to adjust to this change in condition.

On the

other hand, fluctuations in deposits may necessitate immediate adjustment of the asset portfolio or changes in r ates paid on government
securitie s may initiate an immediate revision of the bank's portfolio.
With these time differences it is natural to ask what the appropriate
planning period for a bank is.
profits at all times?

Should the bank maximize the flow of

Should the bank maximize the annual change in

net worth, or should the time horizon be much longer?
William Bryan and Willard Carleton in an analysis of the day to
day f luctuations in a single bank conclude that their study
supports the image of an individual commercial bank which at
all times seeks to minimize its holdings of nonearning assets
and IVhich makes adjustments to shifts in deposits and loan
demand by changing its borrowing position. While excess
reserve position appears to be responsive to changes i n the
yi eld foregone in that asset nearest to cash, U.S . Treasury
bills, it appears to be unrespansiv8 to shifts in loan demands or to movements in deposits.4
40
William R. Bryan and Willard T. Carleton, "Short-Run Adjustments
of an Individual Bank," Econometrica 35 (April 1967), 342.
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Bryan and Carleton's study initiated further research on the actual mode
of the adjustment process to deposit variability or changes in loan demand.

The studies are conflicting and inconclusive.
Donald Hester and James Pierce argue that
the ease of purchase and sale clearly differs among assets.
Cash can be exchanged instantaneously at zero cost. Treasury
bills can be purchased or sold quickly at low cost.
Transaction fees for other U.S. government securities are
higher than those for bills.
Mortgages can be acquired
quickly and in volume only if the banlc is willing to incur
high promotional expense and/or make rate concessions.
\Vhile the purchase of other loans involves the same sort
of costs of rapid and extensive acquisitions as mortgages,
there is no organized secondary market for these assets.
If a bank were to receive an increase in the l evel
of its deposits, even if it knew with certainty that the funds
would not be withdrawn, it would not attempt to place them
immediately in an illiquid form.41

The bank will adjust slowly , buying first tho se assets with which lower
transaction costs are associated (and also lower rates of return).
Aft er some l onger period of time the bank will acquire high return
assets complet ing the adjustment process.
William Dewald and Richard Dreese argue in a similar fashion:
Banks facing re serve deficits because of deposit withdrawals
or excess accumulation of earning assets have several alternatives open to them to meet their reserve requirements: earning assets can be sold; deposits can be at tracted; or funds
lhe
can be borrowed from the Federal Reserve or others.
reserve adjustment instruments include assets with short
maturities traded in well-established markets and hence with
little risk of depreciation in the immediate run.
Portfolio adjustments would be made until each alternative adjustment offered equal marginal net yield . If a
reserve loss is expec ted to be permanent, a bank would disinvest in that asset for which the marginal yield was expected
to be the smallest. In the case of reserve losses that were
expec ted to be reversed , however, a bank would consider the
net cos t of sell ing an asset and subsequently buying it back.
41
Donald D. Hester and James L. Pierce , "Cross -Section Analysis
and Bank Dynamics," The Journal of Political Economy, 76 (Jul yAugust 1968), 760, 762.
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Temporary reserve changes would lead banks to a different
portfoli o position than reserve positions that were expected
to be perrnanent.4 2
Dewald and Dreese argue that specific assets may serve as vehicles for
the adjustment process .

Which assets serve as the vehicle depends on

whether a change in deposits or loans demand is considered permanent
or temporary .
Donald Fraser and Peter Rose investigating the role of selected
assets in the adjustment process fo r a sample of five individual banks
43
come to conclus ions that concur with Hester and Pierce's analysi s .
They find that short -run changes of excess reserves are not respons ive
to changes in interest rates, but that given a random "shock" which
di sturbs the banks actual holdings of excess reserve s , the bank returns
to its desired l eve l at most within a few weeks.

With government

securities, as well as with excess reserves, Fraser and Rose find that
the securities are unresponsive to interest rate differentials , but that
t hey do respond to deposit fluctuations.

Their model incorporates a

s tock adj ustment formula to explain a gradual adjustment to a new
optimal level of the s tock of assets.
In the theoretica l model presented in this paper it wil l be assumed
that certa in assets operate as adjustment vehicles.

The bani': will

maximize t he expected flow of net revenues from the se adjustment
44
vehicles over the intermediat e time horizon.
Other assets do not
42
William G. Dewald and G. Richard Dreese, "Bank Behavior with
Respect to Deposit Variability," Journal of Finance 25 (September 1970),
870-871.
43 Donald R. Fra ser and Peter S. Rose, "Short-Run Bank Portfolio
Behavior : An Examination of Selected Liquid Assets," Journal of
Finance 28 (May 1973), 531-537.
44
cf., Chapter ITT, p. 44.
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enter directly into the adjustment process.

The net revenue of all

assets is assumed to be maximized over a longer but finite period of
time (i.e., a year).
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CHAPTER III
A 11-!EORETICAL MODEL OF A CCMMERCIAL BANK

The purpose of this chapter is to develop an overall framework for
the operations of a commercial bank.

It is within the context of this

framework that monopoly power in commercial banking will be scrutinized.
The theory presented here will not be tested.

Its purpose is to

elucidate the simplifying assumptions made in the empirical model which
will be tested.

For this reason an attempt will be made to make the

theory relatively comprehensive.

In previous investigations of monopoly

power in commercial bankli1g, models have been developed and criticized
for exhibiting peculiar aspects of the commercial bank while ignorlilg
other aspects.
error .

Each simplifying assumption is a potential source of

The theoretical model will provide a systematic check for the

possible sources of error in the empirical model.
The profit seeking firm
The commercial bank is a business firm whose basic objective may
be considered to be the accumulation of net revenues.

1he typical

bank begins its business life by establishing a capital fund.

1his may

come in the form of a single proprietorship, a closed corporation, or
an open corporation.

In these respects, the commercial bank does not

diffe r from any other commercial venture.

Once its physical facilities

have been set up, its everyday operations resembly those of a department

store.

Jt acquires inputs of primary securities and cash and is pre-

pared to provide indirect debt for sale to its customers.

35

The basic function of the commercial bank is to act as a financial
intermediary.

As such , it purchases primary securities (in part by

extendi ng loans) from "ultimate borrowers" and issues indirect debt
(receives deposits) for the portfolios of the "ultimate lenders." The
bank participates in two dist inct markets:

a market for primary

securities and a market for indirect debt .
The produc t of intermediation is the indirect financial
asset coined from the underlying primary security and
bearing its own bundle of ut i lities. The reward for
intermediation arises f rom the difference between the
rate of return on primary securities and the interest
or dividend rate they pay on their indirect debt.45
The assets and liabilities of the financial intermediary ar e
highly specialized . As a department store would, the commercial hank
treats its customers at utility maximizers and provides a number of
alternatives designed t o meet the needs and desires of specific groups
of "ul t imate borrowers" and "ultimate lenders" respectivel y.

It

is

here that a commer c i al bank differs f rom any other business venture ,
either commercial or financial.

One of the liabilities devised to

meet the needs of "ultimate lender s" i s de111and deposits .
them unique among business ventures.

Thi s makes

As an ins titut ion commercial

banks create demand deposits, i.e., money.

Commercial hanks are the

onl y business fj rms that arc 1cgally penni tted to issue i ncli rcct debt
in the form of demand depos its .

'/he 1 Cf~al framework that surround s

the commercial banki nr. system has been developed because of the peculiar
nature of the liability, demand deposits, as money.
45
John G. Gurley and Edward Shaw, Money and the Theogt of Finance
(Washington, D.C.: The Bookings Institut1on, 1960), p. 1 3.
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If the commercial bank chooses the maximization of annual nrofits
as a goal, then the bank will maximize the difference between revenues
uerived from the purchase of primary securities and the cost incurred
in the sale of indirect debt, ignoring administrative and operating
cost for the time being.

If these revenues and costs are expressed

in tems of rate s of interest, then the commercial hank Hill maximize:
p

where Pis profits,
(assets) ,

Lr

Ai

,

(5)

A is the total amount of primary securities

L is the total amount of indirect debt (liabilities),

i s the rate of interest paid to the bank on the primary securities,
and

r

is the rate of interest paid by the bank on indirect debt.

Since commercial banks, Hithin the institutional structure and
under gove rnmental regulation, develop different types of indirect
debt and pr imary securities for their customers, one Hould expect
different prices to be associated with each fom of debt and security .
The profit equation could he expressed as :

p

n
l:

j=l
where there are

n

A. i.
J

J

m
l:

k=l

Lk rk

(6)

types of assets and m foms of liabilities.

46
As cxpresseJ , these interest rates
arc average rates, which
ucpend on th e maturity composition of the portfolio, :md arc weir(htccl
averages of th e amount of primary securities purchased at na st time
period sti ll in the portfolio and the prevailing rates of interest at
the time. [f the assets increase, adding more newer assets to the
port folio , the weight of the current interest rate will increase .
Special empirical treatment will be given t o this problem, see
Chapter IV, p. 68 .
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Commerci al bank:
and monopson1st

monopolist

The legal framework within which a commercial bank operates encon~a sses

four basic areas :

branch i ng barriers ;

(3)

(1)

restrictions on bank entry;

limitations on earning assets; and

i nter es t payment limitations.

(2)
(4)

The last two areas are direct restric-

tions on a bank's ass et portfolio and liability holdings.

These insti-

tutional restrictions (reserve requirements, regulation Q, capitalization
res trictions, et c .) will not be dealt with at this point. 47
'!he first two areas may directly affect the intensity of competition
in the banking industry.

Commercial ·banks have to obtain a charter from

either the Comptroller of the Currency or a state banking agency.

These

agencies in the past have been concerned with the problem of "overbanking" within geographical areas and therefore tended to restrict the
number of charter s issued.

Restrictions on branch banking in thirty-

four of the fifty states similarly tends to diminish the degree of competition.

1he existence of monopoly power or monopsony power is character-

i zed by a downward sloping demand curve for the firms product and an
upward sloping supply curve for the firms inputs.

With a do"mward slop-

ing demand curve the monopolist banker is no longer a price-taker, he is
able to cont rol the quantity of his product
or lowering the price.

de~,nded

by either raising

On the other hand the monopsonist in the input

market can affect the quantity of the input supplied to him changing the
price for the input.

Since people voluntarily deposit funds in a bank,

47
These aspects will be incorporated into the emp irical model in
Chapter IV.
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the bank may change its cus tomers decisions by altering the rate of
interest paid on deposits . The same applies for changes in loans:

the

bank extends a greater amount of loans by lowering the rate of interest
48
charged .
49
Let Aj denote the demand function f or the jth type of loan:
A.

J

(7)

48 Note that this concept is open to debate. In David A. Alhadeff
and Charlotte P. Alhadeff , "An Integra ted Model fo r Commercial Banks"
1l1e Journal of Finance, 12 (March 1957) , 26. Alhadeff writes, "In determining portfol1o composition bankers generally avoid rate competition.
At any moment of time, therefore, bankers accept the going rate for
different kind s of credit and adjust their portfolios to the existing
rate schedule." However, Eric Brucker in "A Micro-economic Approach to
flanking Competition , " Journal of Finance, 25 (December 1970), 1140, conc ludes that commercial banks do eXh1b1t the t endencies of price fixers.
"By viewing the bank as a multiple- product price-discriminating fi rm, a
measure of bank output performance was deve loped which has shown to
have a closer relationship to the theoretical concept of monopoly power
111e empirical evidence
than the often used operating ratios.
generated by the applicat ion of thi s model ... suggests that the elasticity measure may prove to be a meaningful indicator of the bank's
relative competitive position . " For a more detailed discussion see
Chapter II I.
49 Followi ng common usage , the demand for credit extended by the
bank i s referred t o as the "demand for loans." Strictly speaking (see
above) , it is funds which are demanded, and loans (as primary securities)
are supplied to and held by the bank as assets. The same considerations appl y to "depos its, " whi ch are referred to here as being
"supplied" to the bank.
501he following notat ion 1vill be used throughout the paper.
l'unct iorwl relationships are c.lcnotcd by superscripts . Number values
a rc denotec.l by the subscripts. Where there is no question of ambiguity,
the argwnents of the functional r ela tionships wi l l be omitted.
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and let

Lk

denote the supply function for the kth

type of deposit:
(8)

Expressed in this form both the loan market and the deposit market may
or may not be per fectly competitive.

No te, also, that one of the A.'s
J

may be cash or reserves t o which is attached an
the Lk's

i.=O
J

and that one of

nmy be demand deposits to which is attached rk=O .

If the market s are monopol is tic or monopsonistic then the bank controls

the rate of inter es t and thereby indirectly affects the volUJlle of

deposits and loans. 51 Equation (7) and (8) may be subst i tuted into
equation (6) to give a profit function:
n

(9 )

i:

I'

j=l
For purposes of exposition de f ine the following inverse functions:
ij (A.)

(10)

J

k
r

(~) = 1

For the functions

k-l

and

k
r

'

def ined in equati on (10), in the ma r -

ket s where there is no monopsony or monopoly power the first partial s
wi th respect to the

J\j ' s

~ nd

Lk ' s

will be ze ro.

.If these fu nctions

51
Dwight Jaffee and Franco Modligiani argue that monopol y powe r wi ll
cause intermediaries to ration credit rather than raise interes t rates .
"A Theory and Tes t o.f Credit J<ationing," American Economic Review , 59
(December 1969) , 850 -871. However, this v1e1v 1s rnd1hed m terms of
the t ime cons traints . "In the long run , a rational banker would select
the rate which maxi mizes his expected profits; but other cons traints
may precl ude immediate full adjustment in the short run" p . 855 .
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were left in their original fom the first partial with respect to rates
of interest would be infinite for perfectly competitive markets.

The

profit function may now be re1-rri tten as:
n
p

);

ij (A.)A.
J

j=l

(11)

J

The hank which chooses to maximize profits will maximize equation
(11) subject to the constraint that assets are equal to liabilities plus

net worth (where one of the

A.'s
J

The bank will maximize the

is cash).

Lagrangian express ion:

;;t_ (P) =
where

n

m

l:

l:

j=l

k=l

n
r

A.

Lk - 6(
j=l

J

m
l:

~ - N)

(12)

k=l

B is a Lagrangian multiplier and N is the capital account.

Cost of loans and deposits
It is argued that the Jrost important costs may not be the interest
2
costs . 5 Associated with each type of asset and each type of liability
there are managerial costs.

These are resea rch costs for loans, adver-

tising costs for deposits, computer costs, accounting costs, secretarial
costs, and the like.

Different types of assets and liabilities have

different cos t s associated with them.

These costs may be given a

functiona l expression:
52
tition:

Goo rge J. Benston, "A Microeconomic Approach to Ranking CompeComment," Journal of Finance, 27 (June 1972, 722-723.
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c.

cj (A.)

cj (Aj (i.))

j=l, .. . ,n

ck

Ck(~)

Ck(Lk(rk))

k=l, . . . ,m

J

J

where Cj

J

is the total cost of administering Aj units of th e

type of asset and Ck
the kth

(13)

~

i s the t otal cost of administering

type of liability .

jth
units of

These cost functions may contain fixed,

as well as variable, cos ts.

The Lagrangian expression for constrained

profits i s now:
n
.;t_ (P) =

l:

J

j =l

n

m
k
l: r Lk

ij A.

l:

k=l

-

s

m
l:

A.

ck

(14)

- N)

k=l ~

J

j =l

m
l:

k=l

j=l

n
( l:

cj -

The first order Eul er maximization conditions are:
a;((P)

ij

~

+

J

A.

J

J

-r k - a/a ~

a;((P)

--ar;
~(P) ---as-

j=l

Jn this case

S

jth

aij
ap:::-

~

~

a cj
a Aj

-

ack

aik

-

-

s

0

s

0 , k=l, ... ,m

j=l , ... ,n

(l Sb)

m

A.

J

l:

-

N

( 1 Sc)

0

k=l

is e4ual to th e rnarginal revenue as sociated with the

type of asset or the rm.rginal cost associated with the

of liability.

(lSa)

kth

type

42

Deposi t-liability fluctuations
Thus far , the model has been developed wi thin the confi nes of
absolute certainty and a riskless world.

It is completely deterministic.

Once the supply and demand functions are known, the banker merely adjusts
the interest rates (and thus his portfolio) until hi s pr ofits are maximized.

However, the connnercial banks supply of deposits and demand for

loans are not abso lutel y cert ain.

Associated with both deposits and

l oans is a degree of variability over time.
variability i s random .

It will be assumed that this

Jf t here is an unexpec t ed increase in deposi t s,

adjustment will have to be made in the asset portfolio as cash is
accunrul ated.

If there i s an unexpected decline in depos its , adjus t ments

will have to be made in the asset portfolio as cash is depl et ed .
At this point it is useful to di stinguish between two cl asses of
assets:

assets that ar e relatively liquid, which are used to

(1)

handle short-term fluctuations; (2) assets that are r el a tively illiquid,
which are not sold t o cope with short-term fluctuations .

The first type

of asset includes those such as case, U.S. Treasury Securities,
Securities for Federal Agencies, and other similar assets with lmv default ri sk.

Markets for this type of security may be assumed to be pe r -

fect l y competitive , i .e ., the demand for loans through these securities
i s not a function of the rate of interest paid by the bank.

"!he bank

controls the volume of these assets:
A.

J

j =l, ... ,h

(l6a)
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1;here there are

h types of assets in this class.

The demand for the

second class of assets i s a function of the rate of interest and this
demand is subject to random variation:
+ njk

(16b)

j;h+l, .. . , n

is the random variation associated with the demand for the

where
j th

type of asset.

Aj (ij).

It is assumed that E(Tlj) ; 0 or that E(Aj)

These assets are not liquidated to handle deposit fluctuations.

Supplies of liabilities are functions of the rate of interest and
are subject t o random variation:
k;l, ... ,m
£k is the random variation associated with

where

(16c)
the

kth liability

and by assumption C( Ek) ; 0 or R(Lk)
Equations (16a) may be written as (17a) and (16b) and (16c) and after
taking expectations may be solved for their inverses in terms of the
interest rates (17b) and (17c) .
.o

i.

1.

i.

ij

rk

r

J

J

J

k

(E(Aj))
(E( ~))

Aj-l(i.),
J

k-1
L (rk),

j;l' ... ,h

(17a)

j;h+l, ... ,n

(l7b)

k;l, . .. ,m

(17c)

Note that the arguments of the interest rate functions are expec ted
values of the volume of assets and liabilities, not the actual volumes.
"fhe accounting identity that assets are equal to liabilities plus
net worth can now be written as:
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n
l:

j=l
h
l:

A.

A.

j=l

+

n
l:

n
l:

n

A.
j=l J
l:

h
A.
j=l J

+

m

Aj

l:

n
l:

Lk -

l:

j=h+l

+

n = 0

k=l

j=h+l

J

h

l:

(18)

N = 0

J

m

j=h+l

l:

l:

k=l

k=l

Aj

Lk

n

m
N

N

Ek

l:

j=h+l

y

k=l

i s a random variable which is a convolusion of the

where

y

ck's,

and has a density function

of the density function of n. 's
J

E(y) = 0 and that f(y)

nj

nj ' s

and

f(y), which is likewise a convolution
and

It

will he assumed that

is symetric in its domain from minus infinity

to pos itive infini t y . 53
It

is conveni ent to visualize the bank as operating under three

dis tinct time horizons.

First , there is the very short run.

This is

the day to day, hour to hour period where changes in the asset portfolio
are not planned, but are merely induced.

If there is a random fall in

the level of deposits, the depositors are paid with cash, thus there is
~n

induced change in the cash account of the asset rort.fol.io.

53
.
k
Si nce the A.'s, AJ's, L ' s, and N are stocks that arc held or
planned to be heldJLy the bank over a given planning horizon, the
random variation may be considered flows in or out of the s t ocks of
assets or liabilit i es.
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Second, there is a slightly longer horizon during which the bank
may alter its holdings of

liquid assets.

As the cash account is de-

pleted, due to a random rise in the loan account or a random fall in deposits, the net marginal return from the cash account may rise above the
net marginal return for other assets.

During the second time horizon,

which may be a week or a reserve week, the bank may sell some of its
liquid assets in such a way that the net marginal return for each of the
liquid assets is equated.

1nird, there is a long horizon of time (i.e.,

a year) over which the expected profits of the bank are maximized .

This

is the planning horizon for the bank on which all of its portfolio
decisions are made .
Whenever the random variable y is positive, cash is depleted in
the first time period by an amount

y.

For the second time horizon the

bank may consider changing its liquid asset holdings (including cash)
by an amount

in order to equalize the net marginal return for all

y,

the liquid assets.

It is possible that the net marginal return for cash

is unchanged, in which case the entire random variation would be absorbed
in the cash account.
Starting with the random variation (y) equal t o zero, expected
profits would be maximized with:

a

f'(P)

ai\j

B ,

j =·l, .. . ,h

(19)

As random variation occurs in the first time horizon, the net l!larp.inal
return to cash may change.

In the second time horizon the bank will

act so as to equate the net marginal returns for the liquid assets:
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a E(P)

a E(P)

a E(P)

~

aAZ

~

(20)

Note that these partials are no longer necessarily equal to 6 since
equality is a condition for profit maximization over the third tiwe
horizon.
Since

is the difference between the optimal amount of assets

y

and the actual amount assets in the portfolio at a point in time.
y

where Aj

A*

=

A\

A*2

+

(21)

+

i s the amount of the

j th

asset removed from the portfolio.

If all the random variation happens to be absorbed in the cash account:

A*

y

A*
J

0,

A*l
j=2, ... ,h

In this case the bank makes no change between the firs t time horizon and
second time horizon.
fir s t time horizon.

It just accepts the induced cash depletion from the
However, if the net marginal return to cash rise s ,

some of the other assets will not be in the portfolio during the second
time period.

They will be removed in such a way as to satisfy equation

lherefore, for small A* and ignoring the cross effects, the Aj
54
may be expressed according to:
(16) .

54 Take the differential such that equation (30) is cont.inuously
satisfied .
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(22)

A*
J

A*
J

=

j /c's=l~

A*

The difference between the optimal amount of the

jth asset and the

actual amount in the portfolio in the second time horizon is a portion of
total change in assets in the first time horizon.

The portion i s a

function of the second partial s of the expected profits function with
respect to the liquid assets (first

h assets).

TI1is portion of assets differing from the optimal may be expressed
in functional form as:

(23)

The interest payments lost when asset s are not in the portfolio is the
sum of the products of
Aj

of the

jth

the rates of interest and the probability that

type of asset will not be in the portfolio.

This

probabi lit y may be interpreted as the percent of the time that Aj* is
not in the portfolio.
'lhe expected value of Aj

of the

jth asset will be:

(2 4)

and the expected interest loss where y>O

is:
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h
E

j=l

i. pj !
y f (y)
J
0

This expression allows

A~

J

dy

to be greater than Aj, so that a non-

negativity restriction must be placed on the Aj.
such a restriction is to order the first

One way to construct

h assets in ascending order

of the values for their second partials and write the expected interest
loss as:

l.

J

This expression may be interpreted as the interest rate times the percent of the

tin~

that some of the

jth asset is not in the portfol io .

The formulation assumes that the probability that

A.

J

is zero .

y

is greater than

However, it also prevents Aj from becoming negative.

There is the possibility of an interest gain when y
y

is negative.

less than zero implies that deposits have randoml y increased or loans

have randomly decreased and that during the first time period cash has
been accumulated . The extra cash may cause the net marginal return to
cash to be helm; the net marginal return to other assets.

Therefore,

during the second time horizon some of t he cash is exchanged for other
asset s , and an increased amount of other assets is held for the second
time horizon.
above.

The conditions for the exchange of assets is the same as

IJuring the second time horizon liquid assets ar e held in such

proportions that net marginal returns to the first
The expected interest gain in this case is:

h assets is equal.
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h
l:

j=l

0

i.
J

J -ooyf(y)

dy

The expected interest gain is not symmetrical with the expected
interest loss.

For the expected interest loss there is a maximum amount

of each of the

assets that may not be in the portfolio

(e.g., the

non-negativity restriction on the A.'s). In addition, at or near
J

optimally the

pj

will be the same increased amounts of Aj

decreased amounts.

However, for larger

IYI

the

and for

pj may become dif-

ferent, and the expected interest loss-gain function will not be
symmetrical.
However, since it has already been assumed that the n. 's and
J

Ek's have means zero and symme trical density functions, the convolusions
of these random variables will also have mean zero and a symmetrical
5
density function. 5 Since the non-negativity restriction assumes that
the probability that

y

is greater than the sum of the assets is zero,

this implies that the negative

y

cannot be less than the negative

value of the sum of the asset.

In addition, the

pj ' s are not evalu-

ated for different values of y, instead, they are evaluated only at
the optimal solution.

Which together implies that the interest gain is

symmetrical with and offsets the interest loss and these terms 1vill drop
out of the expected profits function.
1he bank now maximizes expected profits.

lhe constrained

Lagrangian of the expected profits function is:
55
f!oward G. Tucker, An lntroduction to Probabilit~ and ~lathematical
Statistics (New Yo rk: Academ1c Press, 1962), pp. 33, 1.

so
h
.;((E(P))

n

E

J J

j;l
n
E

+

i.A.

m

cj

E

m
E

k;l

j;h+l

j ;1

l~

ck

(25)

k;l
h

- 8 ( E A.

j;l

where Aj and

kjAj

E

J

+

n
E

j;h+l

A.

J

N)

~are mean values as determined by ij and rk.

Transaction costs
Equation (25) assumes that the sale of assets is costless.
fact, the sale of an asset may involve numerous costs:

In

"transaction

costs, time cost with the bank plus the money charged by the dealer,
and forfeiture costs,
changes ." 56 • 57
jth

and cost associated with interest rate

Transaction costs will be incurred on A* units on the
J

type of asset whenever Aj

is bought or sold.

The probability that

the asset is in the portfolio times the probability that the asset will
be removed

from the portfolio.

This i s so, since one event must follow

the other in order for a transaction to be made .

This may be expressed

as a joint probability distribution.
Let A*
point in time.

be the change in total assets that may take place at any
Let Aj

be the optimal amount of th e

jth

type of

asset

·nw

56
Kenneth Lyon, "Theory of Cormnercjal !lank Portfoho sc·l cction:
SimpU fiecl Model," unpublished paper, p. 4.

57
costs associated with the interest rate changes refers t o the
concept of market risk, which is treated in a separate section.
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is the amount of the jth asset that will be in the portfolio at any
point in time

!;* f(y)

dy

~:

f(y) dy

is the joint probability distribution function that A*
bought or sold.
jth

Let tj

type of asse t.

assets will be

be the cost of transaction $1 worth of the

The expected transaction cost will be the sum of

the probability that each dollars worth of asset 1Vill be transacted
times the transaction cost for that portion

(pj)

of the

jth

asset

that will be transacted

E(Tc)

where

'\

h
E t.
j=l J

1\

pjA*

~

z=-A.

J

A*
00
!_00 yf(y)dy J yf(y)dy
A*

i s the sum of the optimal values of the first

(26)

h assets

h
Ah

~

q=l

Aq

For the continuous case:

}dA*

E(Tc)

(27)

The total expected tran saction cost is the i ntegral of the probability
distribution function evaluated over the entire range of each of the
jth

assets times th e cos t of transacting the

jth

type of asset.
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Market risk
Part of the transaction costs are "cost associated with interest
rate changes ."

Interest rates for the first

h assets are not con-

trolled by the bank, they are determined by the banking industry,
financial markets , and monetary authorities.
the

jth

falls .

If the interest rate on

security should increase then the price of the

jth

security

If it is assumed that interest rate variations for the nation

as a whole are random, the price changes of the primary securities will
also be random and the transaction cost can be expressed as a function
of random variation.

Let Aj

represent the random variation of the

price of the

jth

Also let

be the transaction cost at the time the

acquired.

type of asset, with gj as its density function.
j th asse t is

Then the transaction cost per dollar of the

security is a function of the random variable

jth

type of

A .•

J

(28)

The expression for transaction cost in equation (24) can be substituted
into the expected transaction cost function.
the first

h

It should be noted that

securities tend to be short term in nature and, therefore,

not sub ject to wide price swings.
Default risk
Another form of uncertainty that exists for the bank is default
risk.

Associated with every type or primary security there is a

probabi 1j ty that the loan will be in de rault.

Let 6j be the random

percentage of the j th asset that will be in default:

6 . will have a
J
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domain of 0

Let uj(o.) be the density function of

to 100 percent.

J

the random percentage
100%
o. uj( o.) do.

J

J

0

J

J

is the expected value of the percentage of the jth asset that will be
in default, the probabi lity that Aj of the jth primary securities will
default .

The expected default loss is:
100%
A. J
oJ. uj ( o. ) do.
j=l J 0
J
J
n

E(DL)

(29)

L:

Maximization of expected profits
Transaction cos t s , market r isk, and default risk may a ll be
incorporated into single expected profits function , which the banker
may choose t o maximize with respect to the volume of each of his assets
and liabilities and the rates of inter est charged and paid:
h

n

i.A.
j=l J J

(E(P))

+

L:

n

L:

j=h+l
m

cj

L:

L:

n
L:

Ah .

.

tJ(A.) J pJA* {!
j=l
J --\

B (

k=l

ck

k=l

j=l

-

m k
L: r Lk

kjA.
J

n
L:

j=l

A.

J

A*
yf(y)dy

J yf(y)dy}

A*

N)

dA*

(30)
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If the banker chooses t o maximize profits he will use the Eul er first
order conditions to determine his portfol io deci sions.
with respect to the volume of the first

~~imizing

h assets, and the expected

values of the other assets and liabili t ies (note that this implies that
the banker control s the interes t rates and not the actual volume of
these financia l instruments) :

a E(P)
a A.

0,

j=l, ... ,h

0,

j=h+l, ... ,n

0,

k=l, .. . ,m

J

a

(31)

E(P)

TETfiJ
a E( P)

0

as

Whether or not the banker has some degree of monopoly pov1er he wi ll
allocat e his portfolio of

asset s and issues of liabilities in accord-

ance with the Eule r max imi zation conditions .

The partials of the ex-

pected profi t s function will contain partials of the loan demand and
deposit supply f unction.

If these partials can be estimated on th e

:msis of the bankers behnv ior , then the Lerner index of monopoly power
can be used to measure the degree of monopoly prevalent i.n varjous
banking markets.

"The empirical mode l presented in the next chapter

provides a method of estimating the partial of loan demand and deposit
supply with respect to volume of assets he ld and liabilities issued.

ss

CHAPTER IV
TilE B>IPIRICAL MODEL

The purpose of this chapter is to construct a testable hypothesis
which will indicate whether a monopsony-monopoly model is of interest in
the s tudy of commercial banking behavior.

The theoretical concepts

introduced in Chapter Ill are the foundations for the model proposed
here.

·n1e chapter is divided into two parts:

empirical model; and (2)

the development of an

(1)

a discussion of the data.

'Jhe <.levelopment of the empirical model
The constrained expected profits function is expressed in the
following fom:
3
l:
j=2

(E(P))

i.A .

+

J J

- r 2L
2

c

5
l: ijA.
J
j=4

(l ( 1:

j=l

Rl

5
l: A .
j =1 J

2
3
( l: Lk + N) - l: E(TrCj)
k=l
j=l

s
-

+

(32)

s
A.

J

+

R ( L: Aj) - [,l 2
j= I

Lz

- N)

'l11e first tenn is the interest earne<.l on liqu.id assets:

A1

is cash

on 1;hich no i nteres t is earned;

A2 is U.S. Treasury Securities; and
A3 is securities of other Federal Agencies. 'The second tem is the
interest earned on the less liquid assets over which the bank may have
some monopoly power;

A4 is state and local securities;

A5 is loans.
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111e third tem is non- interest revenue earned by the bank.

This revenue

is assumed to be a constant proportion (R1) of the sum of the first five
classes of assets; it includes income f r om trust departments, service
charges, and other related activities.

The fourth term is the interest

paid on time deposits (L 2).
is paid.

L1 is demand depo sits on which no interest
The fifth tem considers the administrative costs to be a

fixed proportion (C) of the volume of total liabilities plus capital
account.

The sixth tem is the expected transaction costs, which are a

function of the f irst three assets, serving as short-run adjustment
veh iclcs, and the total random variability of deposits and loan demand.
TI1e seventh t em is the accounting identity that assets equal liabilities
plus net worth times the Lagrangian multiplier.

In the seventh term the

subtems are :

other assets as a pro-

(1)

the first five assets;

(2)

portion (R 2) of the first five assets; (3) L1 is the expected level of
demand deposits; (4) L2 is time deposits; and (5) N is net worth.
Some of t hese terms need further explanation.
Administra tive cost, as expressed i n the fifth term, implies several
assumptions :

(l)

costs for the management of different types of assets

and different types of liabilities do not differ (or that costs do not
depend on the asset and liability mix);
are variable; and

(3)

(2)

all administrative costs

there are no economies of scale.

As mentioned

above , the first assumpti on is open to considerable debate and may be a
possible source of error. 58 The second assumption is Jess questionable,
since fixed assets on the average amount to only 1.5 percent of total
58

cr.

Chapter l i , p . 19 and Chapter I II , p. 42.
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assets and net occupancy expenses amount only to 2.3 percent of total
operating expense. 59 Though there may be other fixed costs, these should
be relatively small.
constant cost firm.

The third assumption implies that a bank is a
Table 1 shows the noninterest expense as a percen-

tage of total operating expense for different size banks.

Due to the lack

of individual bank data, it is not possible to establish a test of the
significance of the difference between these averages.

However, under

casual observation there appears to be some problem with the smaller
banks, but the larger banks appear to exhibit constant costs .

In any

event, the total range of variability is less than 4 percent of the total
operating revenue and this approximates constant costs.
As stated in the expected transaction cost in the expec ted profits
function is a func tion of the first three asset classes (cash, U.S.
Treasury Securities, and securities of other federal agencies) and the
random variation of deposits and loan demand.

Many different approaches

to measure the random variation have been suggested .

Dewald and Dreese
utilize two different measures of deposit variability. 6 First, a co-

°

efficient of variation of the daily average of deposits is used :

j
SD

1970

l/N-1

N
l:

t-1

(33)

5
\ederal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Bank Oterating Statistics,
(Washington, D.C.: Federal Deposit Insuranceorporat10n, 1971).
60
uewald and Dreese, "Bank and Behavior and Dcposit Variability,"

p. 87 4

0
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Table 1.

Non-interest costs and bank scalea

Non-interest
expense as a
of total operating revenue

All
banks

Banks with total deposits (in millions)
Under
5
5-10
10-25
25-100 over 100

44.0

47.1

As a % of total
assets
Number of
banks

2.63

*b

13342

4228

43.0

42.2

42.6

43.3

*

*

*

*

3436

3382

1745

551

aRHC , Bank Operating Statistics.
bComparable data not available for different size banks.

Second , they use a coefficient of variation of an estimate of depo sits:

(34)

DV

is tot al depo sits m the

and

are the estimated total deposits (based on seasonality and trend

Xt

in deposits).

The

mating deposits.

22

tth day,

X is average total deposits,

where \

represents the degrees of freedom lost in es ti-

Dewald and Dreese find that the second measure is
superior in its ability to interpret bank behavior. 61 flowever, both
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measures require day to day observation of a sample bank.

Compatable

data for this study does not include day to day fluctuations.

There-

fore, this problem will be avoided by considering expected transaction
costs to be a scalar at the optimal (profit maximizing) allocation of
the portfolio.
The last term in the expected profits function constrains assets
to be equal to liabilities plus net worth.
assumed to be control variables.
trolled directly by the bank.

The first five assets are

lhe first three asset classes are con-

The fourth and fifth assets (state and

local securities and loans) are controlled by the bank indirectly through
the rates of interest charged on these assets.

(Note that the demand

equation fo r either of these assets can be specified for a competitive or
an imperfectly competitive market.

State and local securities are in-

eluded in this group of assets because the literature indicates that they
do not serve as part of the adjustment mechanism for short-term depositliability fluctuations .) 62 The sixth type of asset includes all those
assets elsewhere excluded (fixed assets , trading account securities ,
other securities, and other assets).

Some of these assets service the

first five types of assets and others are completely independent .

It

.is assumed that all are proportional to the volume of first five assets.
The bank which maximizes its expected profits will do so with
respect to i\j ' j=l, .... ,3 (cash , li.S. Treasury Securities, and securities
of other federal agencies) ; E(A 1), j=4,5 (the interest charged on sta te
and local securities and on loans); E(L 2) (the interest paid on time
deposits) ; and 8 (the Lagrangian multiplier).
62

cf . Chapter II, p. 32.

The mean level of demand
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deposits is an exogenous variable as far as the bank is concerned, since
they are unable to pay interest on these deposits.
services and service charges will be ignored .

Differences in

The level of the capital

account for a particular planning hori zon is taken as a given val ue,
not as a control variable.
This calls for some comment, since Federal law, as well as state
laws , requi re a minimum amount cf capital for the organization of a new
bank or the establishment of branch offices.

In addition, in recent

years supervisory authorities have often required new operations to start
with more than the legal minimum.

The sLvervisory authority for the

Federal Reserve member banks comes from Regulation H of the &lard of
Governors and Section 9 of the Federal Reserve Act, which provides that
banks shall hold an "adequate" amount of capital .

The &lard of Governors

and various state agencies have established "rules of thumb" concerning
the adequacy of capital financing. 63 In taking the level of capital
account as a given value, the assumption i s made that the "rule of thumb"
constraint is not operative within the planning horizon.

Since enforce-

ment of the "rule" is by moral suasion and is not uniform, one is justified in assuming that within the portfolio planning horizon capital
accounts are not a control variable.

Hm;ever, over the longer planning

horizon the bank may be undercapitalized (or even overcapitalized).
either case the profit maximizing bank would adjust the size of its
capital account.
63u. Chambers anc.J A. Charnes jn "Inter-Temporal An::tlys.is and
Optimization of Hank Portfolios," build a "leverage rcquirCI'lent" into
their fllJdel of a hanks portfolio. Thi s requirement i s a capital const raint based on the &lard of Governors "rule of thumb . "

In
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Another account similar to the capital account is the loan reserve
account.

These are reserves for bad debts, which are established from

pretax income in accordance with a fonnula pennitted by the Internal
Revenue Service. 64 Each year the bank is allowed to take out of the
pretax income a certain amount based on a twenty-year moving average
of bad debts for that bank, which is placed in the loan reserve account. 65
The loan reserve account is not permitted to exceed three times the
twenty year moving average of bad debts.

For the current year the loan

reserve account cannot be altered , but only in future years in those
cases where the maximum has not been reached.

The account may be used

in the same manner as the capital accOLmt to ins till confidence in depositors and to make additional purchases of primary securities .

There-

fore, the loan reserve account is included in the variable N as part of
the capital account.
The bank which maximizes its expected profits will allocate its
portfolio in accordance with the Euler first order nuximization conditions:
d.c(tE (P))
aA1
qL'(E(P))

aA 2

3E(TrC)/aA

Rl

i2

+

Rl

1

B

SR 2

0

3E(TrC)/3A 2 - B - SR2

()

(:>S)

64
Internal Revenue Service , Internal Revenue Bulletin : Cumulative
Bulletin, 1954 - 1 (Washington , D.C.: U.S. Government Pnntlng Ofhce,
1954), Regulation 118, Section 39.23(k)-r, pp. 60-62 .
65 The permitted addition could be taken as a proxy for F(o) in the
measure of default risk. See Chapter II, p. 25 and Chapter III, p. 47.
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2

2

2

;Q

0

0

(35)

0

5

UlE(P))
as

(1 + R )
2

E A.

j;l

Ll

L2

N; 0

Note that L1 is not a control variable and the expected profits
functions is not maximized with respect to demand deposits.
Table
equations.

expresses the Euler conditions as a system of simultaneous
Table 3 performs two substitutions and reduces the system to

five equations .

Table 4 sol ves the system of five equations in terms of

the rates of interest which will be treated as endogenous variables.
The exogenous variables will be the asset portfolio and the liabilities.
1ne assignment of exogenous and endogenous variables is not intended to
imply causation.

Any monopolist has the choice of choosing to control

either quantity or price, but he cannot control both.

The assets and

liabilities may be chosen as endogenous, or the rates of interest, but
not hoth.
Table 4 expresses the structural form of the model that wi 11 he
tested .

·n,e interest rates are the endogenous variables and the assets

Table 2.

Euler first order Ill'Lximization conditions as a system of seven simultaneous equations

3E(TrC)/aA

1

aE(TrC)/aA
- 3E(TrC)/aA

s

2
3

+

Rl

- 8 (l+R )
2

+

~

- 8 (l+R )
2

+

i2

= 0

+

Rl

- 8(1 +R J
2

+

i3

= 0

+

Rl

- 8(l +R )
2

+

1

+

Rl

8(1 +R J
2

+

1

-

r

c
3
{ (1 +Rzl

l:

j=l

A. J

L - N}
1

= 0

.4

+

4
ai ;aA · A
4 4

.5

= 0

+

5
di ;aA 5 ·As

= 0

2
- ar ;aL 2 • L2

2

+

(1 +R )A
2 4

+

(1 +R JA 2 5

Lz

= 0
= 0

0>
lN

Table 3.

Transfonnation of the Euler first order condi tion sa

aE(TrC)/aA 2 +

~

- S(l+R 7 ) + i 7

0

- aE(TrC)/aA 3 + R1 - B(l+R ) + i
2
3

0

.4

+ ·aE(TrC)/oA

+ 1

1

+

ai 4/aA 4 -A4

+ R - S(l+R ) + i 5
1

s

+

2

?

0

2

3

-

7

Ois/aAs·As
2

- r- - C - or /:l L { (1 +R ) . l: A. - L - N} - ar-/oL (1 +R )A - :lr /dL (1 +R 2)A
1
2 4
5
2
2
2
2 J=l J

~1e first equation in Table 2 is solved for S(l+R ) and substituted into the fourth equation,
seventh equation in Tabl e 2 is solved for L2 and 2substituted into the sixth equation.

0

=

0

The

..,.
0>

Tab le 4.

aE( TrC)/aA
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i3

.4

1

.5
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r

2
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=

aE (TrC) /aA

conditions expressed as a function of the rates of interest

2

- R + S(l +R,)
1

3
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1
2
4
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4
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1
=

=

5
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5 5
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1
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and liabilities are the exogenous variables.
variables

are~,

(l+R 2), C, and N.

Additional exogenous

In its structural form the para-

meters of the endogenous variables is the identity matrix.

The para-

meters of the reduced form of the system of simultaneous equations is the
negative of the parameters of exogenous variables in the structural systern.

Both the order and rank conditions for identification are met.

The

model is overidentified due to constraints that are placed on the parameters of the structural system:

first, the parameters of the endogenous

variables are constrained to be zero or one in the equation in which they
appear; second, the coefficient of R1 is constrained to -1 in the first,
second, and fourth equations; third, the coefficient s of (l+R 2) are
equal in the first, second, and fourth equat ions and they are all equal
to the intercept term in the fifth equat ion; and fourth, the coefficients
of A4 , A5 , and the last exogenous variable in the fifth equation are all
equal. Therefore , the system is a constrained system of simultaneous
equations .
Through a series of albegraic reductions the system can be simplified.

'111e constraints on the coefficients can be used to define new

variables.

When two endogenous variables are combined the result is an

endogenous variable.

When two exogenous variables are combined the

result is an exogenous variable.

When an endogenous and an exogenous
variable are combined the result is an endogenous variable. 66
66 Henri Theil, Princiales of Econometrics (New York:
and Sons, Inc., 1971), p. 92.

John Wiley
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3E(TrC)/3A

(36)

1

(37 )

Defining one

nc~<

exogenous variable and one endogenous variable .
.5

l

Y2

DL

+ Rl

R (r
2

2

5
R ( (1 +R ) I A.
2
2 j=l J

(38)

+ C)

Ll

N)

(39)

The system of equations that i s estimated using two stage least squares
is:

(40 )
Y2

s

The equations of system (40) are behavioral relations for the profit
maximizing banke r.

Observations on a single bank over time would all ow
the estimation of the slopes of the demand for loans (ai 5/aA ), the
5
slope of the demand fo r state and local funds (ai 4/aA 4), and the slope of
the tune deposit supply (ar 2/3L 2).

However, over any extended per iod of

time one would expect these demand curves t o be relatively un stable.
Another approach would be to use cross- sec tional observations on hanks
that are expected to have identical demand function s .

Here banks can be
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classified according to characteristics of the markets within which they
operate.

The slope parameters of the supply and demand equations can

be estimated from observations on the banks of a given class.

This

second approach 1vill be employed in this study.
The expected profits function (equation (32)) assumes that all the
ilssets in a class (e.g., loans) earn the same rate of interest.

How-

ever , from observed data on a bank's portfolio each asset will earn the
current rate at the time that the security was purchased by the hank.
Interest earned on a class of assets is a weighted average of past rates
of interest.

The rationale applies to time deposits.

time deposits is a weighted average of
maturity mix of the debt issues.

Interest paid on

past rates depending on the

Is the weighted average of past rates

or is the current rate of interest the appropriate decision variable for
the banker?

In an effort to answer this question the results of the

cross -sectional

estimation of the slope parameters will be corroborated

hy applying first difference data to equation system (40).

The first

di ffcrence of the interest data will rrore closely reflect the current
market rate than the weighted average of past rates of interest.
The data
1he nnst desirable source of data for this type of study would be
observations on individual banks from a variety of economic region s.
However, while it is possible to obtain balance sheet data of this type,
interest and income data is held in the strictest confidence and i s
difficult to obtai n.
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Therefore, a secondary data source is used.

The Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation (FDIC) publishes balance sheet, interest, and
income data by standard economic area. 67 The Bureau of the Census describes a standard economic area (SEA) "as a county or a group of counties
\vi thin a state, which are homogeneous in general livelihood and socioeconomic characteristics. " 68 TI1e FDIC and Census definitions differ in
areas where there is a significant overlapping of banking services.

In

those states where branch banking is preval ent, the FDIC does not
delinea te SEA's.

Since both SEA definitions are based on counties,

uiscrcpancics can be accounted for and Census data can be made compatible
with l'DJC definitions.
The aggregate banking data for each SFA will be considered an
observation

on an individual bank .

This t ype of aggregation is justi-

f iable when there are no economies of scale with respect to the volume
of assets or liabilities.

Benston's work has indicated that economies

of scale are relevant when the size of individual accounts increases,
but not necessarily when the dollar volume of accounts increases. 69
Since SEAs with different market conditions will be considered separately ,
wi.thin a given bank class it is assuned that there arc no significant
uifferenccs in the size of accounts.
·I he

usc of aggregate bank data necessi tatcs a normal izati.on of the

data so SEAs of uifferent sizes may be compared.

SEAs may d.i(fer in

67
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, =B-'::a-:cnk.,..~=-::-=-::-2':':::-'-',.,.,....nc--1970 (Washington, D.C . : Federal Deposit Insurance
68
Ibid., p. 2.
69 ceorge Benston, "Economies of Scale and Marginal Costs in
Banking," pp. 540-541.
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size because the number of banks within each SEA differ and because the
size of banks beuveen SEAs may differ.
normalization wil l be used:

Three distinct methods of

(1) each asset and liability is expressed

as a percent of total assets;

(2) assets and liabilities are given for

the average bank in the SEA; and

(3) assets and liabilities are ex -

pressed on a per capita basis within the SFA.
In order to apply cross sectional data to the system expressed in
equation (40) it is necessary to observe banks which would be expected
to have similar loan demand and deposit supply functions.

Similarity

of demand and supply functions can be discussed at two levels; the
industry and the fi rm.

Each banking market defines an industry within

which several banks may compete.

Some banking markets may be expected

to di f fer from others and, therefore, the banks within the respective
markets woul d be expected to have different deposit supply and loan demand functions.

For instance, in an agricultural community the principle

borrowers are farmers.

They borrow to meet the needs of the farm, which

are seasonal and subject to the whims of the weather.

The elasticity

of demand for loans from farmers depends on the production function and
the expected demand for crops.

On

the other hand the banks in an

industrial area are faced with an entirely different set of borrowers
seeking loans for entirely different reasons.

Tn th ese two hanking mar-

kets t he loan clcrnand function for the market may he expected to d:iffer.
A.ltcrnativc1y, at the level of the firm agricultural areas nrc gcncrnlly
rural and can be characterized by the average distance the prospective
customers live from their banking alternatives.

Because of the greater
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anticipated distance from customer to banking alternative in an agricultural area, one would expect the firm to have a more inelastic deposit suppl y and l oan demand func tion than a bank in an industrial
area where the proximity of competitive banking services is much greater.
At the level of the industry the income of peopl e in the banking
market may affect the industry demand for loans and

Sl~ply

of deposits.

f'eople with higher incomes have a t endency to save more than people
with lower incomes.

People with higher incomes will tend to borrow a

larger amount of funds for larger projects than people with lower incomes.

At the level of the firm people with higher income will have a

broader range of opportunities for seeking banking services than people
with lower income .

If a bank ' s customers have lower income one would

expect the loan demand and deposit supply to be more inelastic than for
a bank with more affluent customers.
At the level of the firm the number of banking competitor ' s may be
expected to affect the elasticities of loan demand and depo sjt supply.
A bank with fewer competitors would be expected to have more inelastic
demand and supply functions .
The banks in the sample will be divided into eight different
cl asses, on the presumption that banks within each class will experience
approxima tely the same demand and supply functions.
be used to categorize banks:

(1)

(agricultural or non-agricultural):
cultural

en~loymcnt

Three criteria will

Economic base of the banking market

An index of the ratio of agri-

to total employment for the hank.tng market divided

by the same ratio for the nation is used to classify a market as
agr icul tural or non-agricultural.

If the index is greater than one

the area is cl assified as agricultural; otherwise nonagr icultura l.
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. .
. as a d emand var1a
. b le. 70
George Kaufman uses a S1ffillar
rat1o

Eric Brucker
71
uses a loan mix variable (ratio of agricultural loans to total loans).
Both Brucker and Kaufman use these variables in the specification of

demand functions.

The approach in this paper is to separate banks accord-

ing to these characteristics, rather than to incorporate the ratios into
the demand function.

(2)

Income of the banking market:

an index of

per capita income similar to the economic base index is used to divide
banking markets into "rich" markets and "poor" markets .

Brucker, in his

attempt to estimate structural variables (loan/asset ratios and elasticity of loan demand) includes an income variable to "enable the separation of poor regions from rich regions." 72 Likewise, Kaufman includes
income as a demand variable.
according to the number
banking market.

(3)

Bank density:

Banks are classified

of banks per capita within the appropriate

An index is calculated using the ratio of the market

density to the national ave rage.

Both Brucker and Kaufman use this

index as a structural variable.
1nc f-DIC delineates 289 SEA's in thirty-four states.

The remaining

states were not subdivided into SEA's since extensive branch banking
would

n~ke

the disaggregated data meaningless.

Table 5 depicts the

division of SEA's into eight classes; four agricultural and four nonagricultural.

/\s shown, the breakdown on the density and income i.ndi.ccs

differ between the agricultural and non-agricultural communities.
70

Georgc Kaufman, "Bank Market Structure," pp . 433-435 .
71 Eric Brucker, "Banking Competit ion," p. 1140.
72
rbid ., p. 1138.

Table 5.

Bank
class

Standard economic area classification
!\'umber of
observations

Economic base

Bank density

Income

14

non-agricultural index < 1

low density index< .S

poor index < 1

71

non-agricultural index < 1

l ow density index < . 5

rich index > 1

3

20

non-agricultural index< 1

high density index> . 5

poor index < 1

4

20

non-agricultural index < 1

high density index> .5

rich index > 1

23

agricultural index > 1

low density index < 1

poor index< . 93

29

agricultural index > 1

low density index < 1

ri ch index> .9 3

65

agricultural index > 1

high density index > 1

poor index< .93

.J-

agricultural index > 1

high density index > 1

rich index > .93

1

6

8

-.._,
LN
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The reason for this is that the density on a per capita basis is on the
average higher in rural communities due to lower population.

Similarly,

average i ncome percapi t a is higher i n nonagricultural areas.

Therefore,

if the densi t y index is less than .5 in the nonagricul tural community,
the SEA .i s consider ed one of low bank density .

If the income index is

less t han .9 3 in the agricultural community , the SEA is considered a
poor region.
Sinc e the demarcat i on

bet~<~een

bank classes is

some~<~hat

arbitrary

an attempt is made to illust r a te the significant differences between the
classes.

Table 6 shO\<Is the level of significance in the differences

bet~<~een

the ave rage non- i nt erest earning assets to total asset s ratios

(R ) , the average non- interes t revenue to total assets ratios (R ), and
2
1
t he non-interest cost to total assets ratios (C), between bank c lasses .
A level of s l[,mificance of . l means that there is a 10 percent chance
that the diffe rence in the means between the t1<1o bank classes is clue t o
random variation.

The table indicat es that all bank classes are signifi-

cantly different in at l east one respect .
different in only one respect.

Seven groups are signi ficantly

The remaining twenty combinations are

significantl y different in a t least two respects.

Tl<lelve combinations

are s ignificantl y different in all three respects .

Therefore, it is

concluded th at the eight different bank cla sses represent different
types of markets.
Population, income, ;md workforce data i s taken from the 1970
73
census.
Where the SEA definitions of the Bureau of the Census differ
73
u.s. Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, Census of
Population-1970 Volume I - Characteristics of the Population
(Wash1ngton, D.C.~overnment Pr1nt1ng Off1ce,) 1973).

75

Table 6.

-

--

Level of significance in the differences between average
non - interest earning assets to total assets ratios,
non-interest cos t to total asse ts ratios, and non interes t revenue to total assets r atios between banks

·=

R2 - non-interest earning assets t o total as sets

Bank
cl ass
1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8

1

3

0
.1
.00 5
.00 5
.005
. 005

0
.005
. 005
. 05
.00 5
.005

0
.005
.05
.005
.005

4

5

6

7

0
. 005
.1
.005
.005

0
.05
. 005
.05

0
. 005
. 005

0

8

0

R - non - interest revenue to total assets
1
Bank

~!~~~-- - -- ! _______

1

0

2
3
4

. 05

5
6

7
8

.0 5
.05
.005
.005

C

?______ _~-- - - -- --~- --- ----~ - -- -----~--- --- --? __ ___ __ §_
0
.005
.1
.005
. 005
.005
.005

0
.005
.1
.1

0
.005
.005
.005
.00 5

0
. 005
.005

0
.005
.005

0
0

non-interest cost to total asse t s

Bank

cl as s

7
8
------- --- ---- -------------3 --- ------- --- -----5 ---------6 -- ---------- ----1

0

2
3
4

.05
. 05
.1
.05
. 05
.00 5
.005

5
6

7
8

()

0

0

0
0
0
.05
.005

.1
_oo5

.1
.00 5

.0 5

0
. 005

0
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from FDIC definitions, county data is referred to and SEA data is adjusted to confonn with FDIC definitions.

Interest data is reported by

the FDIC in dollars of income earned on a class of assets or paid on
a class of deposits.

This data is converted to an interest rate by

dividing the interest income by the volume of the asset held by the
bank on the balance shee t date, ignoring the distortion caused by the
74
fluctuations in asset holding over the year.
Therefore, the interest
rate is a weighted average of interest rates charged this year and in
past years.

Assets and liabilities are also reported in dol l ar figures.

To allow the comparison of banks of different sizes these data are con ve rted to percentages of total assets.
these data, they are normalized profits.

When profits are calculated from
To get actua l profits one

nJUst multiply by the total expected assets of the bank .

74

see Chapter V, p. 81.
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CHAPTER V
11-!E EMPIRICAL RESULTS

This chapter explores several alternatives for estimating the parameters of the system of equations (40) .

In order to compare banks of

different sizes it is necessary to normalize the data.
procedures are used.

Three distinct

The first approach is to use data which expresses

as sets and liabilities as a percent of total assets.
observation i s treated as the average bank in the SEA.

Second, each
Third, assets

and liabilities are expressed in terms of the dollars of assets per
capita in the banking market.

The parameters of equation system (40)

are the slopes of the demand for

state and local funds, the demand for

loans, and the suppl y of time deposits.

Estimates of these parameters

are used to estimate the elasticity of demand for state and local funds,
the elasticity of demand for loans, and the elas ticity of time deposit
supply.

These elasticities are used as an ordinal measure of monopoly

or monopsony power.

In addition, an attempt to focus on the impact of

the current rates of interes t is made by using the firs t difference between 1970 observations and 1969 observations of assets, liabilities,
and rates of interest.
Assets anu .I iabilities as a
percent of total assets
Table 7 sumnariz es the results of a two stage l east squares est i mation of the parameters of equation sys t em (40) for eight bank classes.

Table 7.

Two stage least squares analysis of eight bank classes using cross sectional data with
assets and liabilities as a percent of total assets

Bank

4
ai /aA4

class
i

4

=

.0322
(.0091)

+

.4

3

=

.0423
( .0019)

y2

=

.0816
(. 0072)

.4

1

= • 0390

(.0037)
v

'2

4

.-l

1

y,

-

+

(.0288)

1

=

0747
c:o2:m

=

.0468
(.00 -\8)

=

.0 797
(. 0163)

5

.OSlO A
(.0693 4

y = .0658

2

ar 2;aL2

5

ai ;aA

.011 0 A
(.OSS3) 5

+

.8 229 DL
( . 6489)

.0282 b A
(.0139) 4
.1303 DL
(.1230)

.0010 As
(.0129)
.0122 A
(. 027S) 4
.0184 As
(.OSOO)

+

. 7740b DL
(. S761)

.0508 b A
( .03 58) 4
.o1ss As
( . 0331)

+

.SS29b DL
(.3S64)

R2

Degrees of
freedom

F

.0431

(1,1 2)

.S41

.1437

(2 ,11)

. 923

OS62

(1,69)

4.111

.0168

(2,68)

.S 81

. 0109

(1,18)

. 198

.0990

( 2 ,1 7)

. 934

.1 009

(l ,18)

2.019

.1243

(2 ,17)

1. 206

---- -------- ---- ----- ---------- -- --- ------------ ---- ------------------- -------------------------- -- ----- ----

~

00

Table 7.

Cont inued

Bank

4
ai ;aA 4
. 0274 a A
(.0208) 4

class
s

6

.4

; .0424
(.0029)
Yz ; .os7s
(.0094)
l

.4

; .0335
(.0038)
y7 ; .0825
- (.0139)
l

i 4 ; .0401
( . 0023)
y ; .0670
2 ( . 011S)
8

.4

; .OH3
( .00 30)
y ; . 0806
2 ( . 0116)
l

-

+

2
ar ;ar. 2

ais/aAs

.02S6a As
(.0191)

+

.3364a DL
(.2474)

.0326 A4
( . 028S)
.0254 As
(. 0283)

+

.S408b DL
( . 2879)

.OlS8 A
( . 0186) 4
+

.0173 AS
(.0239)

+

.2221 DL
(.2414)

. o2s2 As
(. 0259)
-

.0066 As
(. 0226)

.1261 DL
(.1773)

Degrees of
freedom

F

.0764

(l '21)

l. 737

.l2SS

(2 , 20)

l.43S

. 0463

(l '27)

l. 312

.1197

(2,26)

l. 767

.0113

(l ,63)

. 722

.0293

(2,62)

.935

.0206

(l ,4S )

. 948

. OlS2

(2 '4 4)

. 339

R2

aSignificru1t at d1e 90 percent level, using the students t-statistic ru1d recognizing tl1at it is only a
proxy for the appropriate test statistic for simultru1eous equations.
bSignifie<ult at tile 9S percent level.

__,

"'
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Data which express assets and liabilities as a percent of total assets
2
are used. In all cases the R is relatively low, but the parameter
estimates appear to follow fue expected pattern. It is anticipated that
4
the sign of ai /aA 4 in the f irst equation be negative. It is estimated
as a negative value in all cases, except class l and class 6..' and in
thes e cases the standard error of the estimate is high relative to the
paran~ter estimate . The sign of ai 5/aA 5 in the second eq~tion is expected to be negative.

It is estimated as a negative value in all

cases, except classes 1 and 7, where, again, the standard error of the
estimate is high relative to the size of the parameter estimates. The
sign of ar 2;aL2 in the second equation is expected to be positive. It
i s estimated as a positive value in all cases, except clas ses 2 and 8,
where , again the standard error of the estimate is relatively high.

'l11e

fact that the parameter estimate has the expected sign does not imply
that the bank class has a high degree of monopoly power, but only that
the elasticity of demand may be less than infinity.

The actual degree

of monopoly should be measured by the elasticity of demand.
Little is known about the small sample properties of the above
es t imators .
that the

It is understood, however, for such systems of equations

r: and t- sta tisti cs are not necessarily the appropriate test-

statistics.

llowever, convention suggests that both the

used as proxies for the appropriate test -statistics.

I'

and the

lf the

t

be

F-

statisti c is a proxy for the appropriate t est-statisti c , the est imated
equations f or classes 4, 5, and 6 have a

.75 probability of explaining

more than just the average variation in the endogenous variable.
classes 4, S, and 6 the

For

t-statistic indicates that the slope of the

81
deposit supply ftmction i s significantly different from zero.

In

classes 4 and 5 the slope of the demand for state and local funds is
significantly different from zero.

In class 5 the slope of the loan

demand is significantly different from zero .

In the other bank classes

one would conclude that the data does not exhibit monopoly power, since
the slopes of the demand and supply functions are not significantly different from zero and this implies that the elasticities of supply and
demand are not significantly different from infinity.
2
There are a munber of possible explanations for the low R s:
(1)

The use of aggregate bank data may incorporate spurious variation.
75
Within each SEA size of banks extends over a wide range.
Aggregating
bank data from banks of different sizes may produce a distorted variation,
wi th the ac:t.ions of a small bank being overwhelmed by the actions of a
large bank.

(2)

The interest rate calculations (interest earned

divided by the volume of assets) may not reflect the current market rate.
lf the current market rates are used, they affect bankers' decisions with

regard to additions to the portfolio of assets, but not with regard to
V1ose assets already in the port folio.

(3)

The use of asset and lia-

bility data implies that an additional constraint is placed on the data.
1ne sum of the assets must equal one, as well as being equal to the sum
of the liabilities and net worth.

The expression of data in this form

was necessary so that banks (SEAs) of different sizes may be compared.
2
The additional constraint may cause a downward bias in the value of R .
75
'Ihe FDIC: data may be disaggregated into banks of different sizes
on a s tatelvide basis, but not for an individual s t andard economic area.
Therefore , it is not possible to accurately estimate the range of bank
s i zes within an SEA.
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Assets and liabi lities for the
average baiik m tll'i SEA
Instead of normalizing assets and liabilities with respec t to total
assets, the dat a for the SEA may be converted to an average volume of
assets and liabilities by dividing SEA assets and liabilities by the
number of banks in the SEA.

The use of average bank data implies that

one would expect the size of al l banks within a class to be the same.
Using the aggregated data for an SEA i s valid if all banks within the

SEA are the same s ize, so that the aggregate bank data refl ect s an
observati on on a single bank.

76

Using arerage bank data to estimate

the parameters of demand and supply functions for a bank cl ass , implies
tl1at the bank sizes within each class, as well as within each SEA, ar e
expected to be the same for all banks.
Table 8 presents the results of two stage least squares estimation
of equation sys t em (40) where average bank data for each SEA are used .
Aga in using the F-statistic, the first equations for bank c lasses 3, 4,
5, and 6 have a .90 probability of explaining more than just the average
variation in the endogenous variable.

The second equation is signifi-

cant at the . 75 level for class 3, the . 90 level for class 4, and the

.SO l eve l for classes 5 and 6.

These f our bank classes appear to ex-

hibit some degree of monopsony or monopoly power.

Based on the t-

statistic , recognizing its limi tations, the parameter estimates of some
of the variab l es are significantly different f rom zero, with the standard
error less by some multiple than the estimated value of t he coeffi cients .
It is interesting to note that this analysis does not find the slope of
5
the loan demanu function (ai ;aA 5) in class 5 to be di fferent from zero.
76

see Chap ter IV, p. 70.

Tabl e 8.

n;o stage least squares analysis of eight bank classes using average assets and liabilities per bank

Bank

4
<li /3A

class
l

2

4

.0369
(. 0044)
y = .0806
2
( .0048)
i

.4

1

=

=

. 0384
(.0006)

+

Y2 = . 0786

4

.4

.0402
(. OOlS)
y = .0829
2 (. 0050)
1

4

=

+

-

,04S1 ( . 0290)
Y = .0716
2
(. OOSO)
i

=

R2

2

+

3

.00002 32 DL
(.000014S)

. 00000002 A
(.000000-3) 4

( . 0007)

3

<lr /31

.00000034 A
( .00000080) 4
- . 00000049 AS
(.0000004S)

+

2

<lis /<lAs

4

.00000003 A - . 00000075 DL
(. 00000003) 5
( .00000084)

.000001SlbA
(. 00000071) 4
- .00000184aAS
(. 00000118)

+

. 0000358 DL
(. 0000392)

.00000158bA
(. 00000084) 4
- . 00000018 As
( . OOOOOOSl)

+

. 0000285b DL
( . 0000138)

Degrees of
freedom

F

.0141

(l ,12)

. 171

. 2067

(2,11)

1.433

.0049

(1 , 69)

.340

. 0019

(2 ,68)

. 411

. 2002

(1 '18)

4 . S04

.1S 72

(2 '17)

1.S8S

.1637

(1,18)

3. S23

.26S8

(2,17)

3. 077

00

"'

Table 8.

Cont inued

Bank

4
ai /aA 4

class
s

6

.4

.0418 ( .0019)
y2 = . o7so
(.0040)

1

.4

1

=

8

.4

= .0393
(.0013)
y2 = .0790
(.0033)

1

i

4

.0377 +
(.0010)
y2 = .0748
(. 0021)
=

. 00000145al\
00000083) 4
As

+

(. 00000063)

(

R2

Degrees of
freedom

F

.1269

(1, 21)

3. 052

. 0883

(2 . 20)

. 968

. 1169

(1, 21)

2. 779

.0865

(2,20)

.947

.0114

(1,63)

. 920

. 0092

(2. 63)

.0166

(1,4S)

.7S 7

. 0051

(2,44)

.112

0

+ • ooooooo1

= . 0- 27

(.0076)
y2 = .0751
(.0036)
7

(

2
or /aL2

ais /aAs

.0000187 DL
(. 0000178)

. 0000018Sb A
00000076) 4
0

+

.00000008 AS
( .OOOOOOS6)

+

.0000152 DL
(. OOOOlSS)

.00000116 A
(. 00000121) 4
.00000072 A
( . 00000120) 5

+

.0000236 DL
(.0000313)

.00000059 A
( .00000068) 4
+

.00000017 As
(.00000068)

-

.0000001 7 DL
( _00001 788)

0

aSignificant at the 90 percent leve l, using the students t- s tati stic and recognizing that it is only a
proA~ for the appropriate test statistic for ~multaneous equations.
bSignificant at the 95 percent level.
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1ne analysis of Table 7 finds the value of this parameter to be negative
and significantly different from zero.

Likewise, in class 6 the value of

the slope of the loan demand function is estimated as a positive value,
where the previous analysis had estimated it to be negative . Also, for
class 6 the estimate of ai 4/aA4 is negative and significantly different
from zero, where the analysis of data ecpressing assets as a percent of
total assets estimates the parameter to be positive.

All of these

discrepancies may be due to a wide variation in bank size within each
4
bank class. Estimates of ai /aA 4 and ai 5;aA for bank class 3 are
5
significantly different from zero, which reinforces the results of the
previous case.
Assets and liabilities per
capl ta m the SEA
To avoid making the assumption about the identical size of banks
for all SEAs in a bank class, the following approach is taken.
bank data is normalized by the number of people in the SEA.

The

This im-

plies that a certain amount of banking service (assets per capita) is
provided for each person in the banking market and that increasing the
number of people in the SEll will proportionately increase the demand for
banking services .
Table 9 presents the results of two stage least squares estimation
of equation system (40) using bank data per capita.

Using the F-

statistic, the probability that the first equation explains more than
just the average variation in the endogenous variable is .90 in classes
4 and 5 and .75 in class 3.

The probability that the second equation

explains more than just the average variation in the endogenous variable

Table 9.

TNo stage least squares analysis of eight bank classes using average per capita asse ts and
liabilities in the bank marketing area

Bank

4

class
1

2

3

4

5
ai /aAs

ai /aA

i

=

.0423 ( . 0058)

Yz

=

.0909
(.0071)

i

4

4
. OOS2 A4
( . 0081)

a
- .oos8 As
(. 0036)

= .0399 ( .0013)
\' = • 0790
. 2 ( . 0017)

.001 6 A
(.0014) 4

.-l

= .0401 (. 0020)
y = .09S3
' 2 (.0061)

. 0042 aA
(. 0029) 4

-4 = .0459 ( . 0032)
y 7 = . 0747
- ( . 0066)

b
.00 71 A
( . 0037) 4

l

l

+

ar 2/aL 2

+

.011 7 DL
( . 0179)

.ooo3 As
(. 0008 )

b
- . o1o9 As
(. 003S)

- .oon As
(. 0029)

.1147 DL
( .111 7)

+

+

.13S6a DL
( . 0916)

.0913a DL
(. 0571)

R2

Degrees of
f reedom

F

. 032S

(1,12)

.40S

.1961

(2 ,11 )

l. 34 2

. 0169

(1,69)

1.185

.0093

(2 ,68)

. 30S

.1 01S

(1,18)

2.033

. 4083

(2 ,1 7)

S.865

.1720

(1,18)

3. 739

.1469

(2, 17)

1.464

00

a-

Table 9.

Continued

Bank

4
ai /aA 4
a
.0049 A4
( . 0031)

class
s

.4

l

= .0420

(.0022)
y2 = .081S
(.OOSl)
6

7

8

.4

l

=

.0364
(.0031)

y7
-

=

.076S
(.0061)

.4

.0378
(.0019)
y 2 = .08S3
(.0036)
l

.4

l

=

= .0376

(.0006)
y, = .07S3
(. 0012 )

- .oo29 As
(.0026)
+

.0708a DL
( . OSSS)

+

3

.0732 DL
(. 04 SO)

.0004 A
(. 0026) 4
b

- .oo31 As
(. 0013)
+

+

.0017 A
4
( . 0039)
- .0018 As
(.0021)

+

2
ar / aL
2

ais/aAs

+

.0316 DL

c.040 3)

b
.0008 A
(.0004) 4
+

.ooo3 As
(. 0007)

.0083 DL
( .0248)

Rz

Degrees of
freedom

F

.1032

(1 ,21)

2. 41S

.0803

(2 , 20)

.873

.0067

(1, 27)

.183

.092 S

(2 ,26)

1. 32S

.ooos

(1 ,63)

.029

.0868

(2,62)

2.94S

.lOO S

(1,4S)

S.026

.0038

(2,44)

.084

aSignificant at the 90 percent level, using the students t-statistic and recognizing that it is only
a prox·y for the appropriate test statistic for 5Lmultaneous equations.
bSigniftcanr at the 95 percent level.

00
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is .975 in class 3, .75 in classes 4 and 6, and .SO in class 5. The
4
estimates of ai /aA 4 is negative, except for classes 6, 7, and 8. The
5
estimates for ai /aA 5 are positive only for classes 2 and 8. The estimates for ar 2/aL 2 are negative only for classes 2 and 8. Equations (40)
do not explain the data for classes 2 and 8.
high income, and low bank density.

Class 2 is nonagricultural,

It is also highly urban.

Ninety-

six percent of the SEAs in class 2 contain a standard metropolitan statistical area.

1hese are not the conditions under which one would expect

to find bank monopoly or monopsony power.
high income, and high bank densi ty.

Bank class 8 is agricultural ,

Even though it is rural (only 6 per-

cent of the SEA's contain standard metropolitan statistical areas) , the
high income and high bank density would lead one to expect a more competitive market.
lstimation of elasticities
Using the three methods of expressing assets and liabilities some
of the bank classes appear to exhibit some degree of monopoly or monopsony power, with the s lope parameters significantly different from zero
(using the t-statistic as a proxy for the appropriate test-statistic).
However, the best measure of monopoly power is not the slope of the demand function, but the Lerner index or the elasticity of demand.

Be-

cause the F-statistics are consistently higher for the third method of
normalizing assets and liabilities, the parameter estimates from assets
and liabilities per capita are used to estimate elasticity.
Table 10 present s estimates of elasticities of demand and supply
hased on the parameter estimates in Table 9.

i\n

elasti.city is cal culated

for each SEA in the bank class and all elasticities within the class are

Table 10 0 Average estimated elasticities of demand for s t ate and local funds and loans and elasticity
of time deposit supply by bank class based on estimates of demand and supply parameters
using per capita assets and liabilities
State and local funds
Bank
a
class Estimated Upper a
Lower
1

2

-12o37

~o8)c

-36 059

-2202

4

5

Loans
Upper a

-Sol7b
~-3o2)

-16907

~5,-19o5)

3

-504

Estimated

-1403

7008

~9o3)

-14 o75b
-3700
"(=4'/.7,-807)

-8o7

-8o 24b
-2505
( -1702 ,- 504)

-309

-1 2o98b
-29ol
nn,-8oo)

-7 07

-2 o84b

-7 07

Lowera
-300

13200

19 00

-1.62
~o 6)

-1.4

-23013
l-0o4)

-41.3

-1304

-10 092

-1 5o3

-7 02

~7,-So8)

ol8

Lower a

o30

oll

-6o65

-076

o35

o08

o32

o10

o39

021

""(0:9, 010)

-7 07

~-2 o 2)

Time de~si ts
Upper a
Estimated

ol4b
~010)

02ob
~13)

o30b
~16)

00

10

Table 10.

Continued

State and local funds
Bank
Lower a
class Estimated Uppera

6

30.03

~ )

128.80

19. 0

251 .l

78.5

62.86b
126.3
T41.9,125 . 6)

6.2

~oo)

8

39.3

Estimated

Loans
Uppera

-12 . 83
(-oo,-5. 9 )

-20.1

-8 . 63b
-15.1
l-14.9,-6.1)

72 . 6
~oo)

110.6

Lowera

-8.3

Time deposits
Estimated
Uppera

.Zlb

Lower a

.29

.13

. 84

. 34

"[:34,.13)

-5.4

9.2

. 56
D5,oo)

-1.64
~.40)

-2.6

-.1 7

~e estimated elasticity is calculated by dividing the slope of the demand or suppl y function into the
ratio of interest rate to volume of the asset or liability for each SEA and averaging for all SEA's in
a bank class. The upper figure is the highest elasticity for an SEA in the banking class and the lo1ver figure
is the lowest elasticity for an SEA in the banking class.

bBased on parameter estimates which the "t-statistic" indica t es are significantly different from zero .
cln order to indicate a range of possible elas ticity estimates elasticities were calculated for values
of the parameter that are one standard deviation above and below the estimat ed parameter value .

\D

0
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averaged to yield an estimated elastic ity for the bank class.

Table 10

also indicates the high and lo1v elasticity for SEAs in each bank class.
The upper and lower elasticities represent a range of estimates el as ticities within a bank class, but it does not represent a confidence
interval.

Without knowing the exact di stribution of the parameter es ti -

mates it is impossible to est ablish a confidence interval for the estimated elasticity .

However, a range over which the estimates may be con-

sidered reliable may be established by calculating the elasticities for
values of the parameters that are one standard deviation above and
below the estima ted value of the parameter.

For instance, the es timated

average elasticity of demand for state and local funds in bank class l
i s -12.37 .

In bank class 1 the lowest el as ticity for an SEA i s es timated

at -5 .4 and the highest i s -22.2 .

1f the parameter va l ue wa s one s tand -

ard deviation less than its est imated value, the elastici ty of demand
would have risen to infinity; if the parameter were one s tandard deviation more , the elas ticity would be -4. 8.

The elasticity estimate ,

though low, is not significantly different from infinity .
The Lerne r i ndex is an ordinal ranking device.

If the absolut e

value of elasticity of demand is l ower for one bank than another , then
it may be said that the former ha s a higher degree of monopoly p01ver.
llowever, the index cannot be used to measure monopoly power "ithout a
reference point.

J'or ease of exposition , an elastici ty of 10 is arbi -

traril y chosen as a reference point.

If the absolute value of the

elasticity is less than 10 the bank is said to have monopoly power in
a relative sense.

If the elasticity i s gr eater than 10, the bank is

said to be relatively non-monopolistic.
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The estimates of the elasticities of demand for state and local
funds in al l cases are relatively high and could not be considered as
representing monopoly power for the bank.

Only in class 4 is the

elasticity less than 10 .
The estimates of the elasticities of demand for loans are significantly lower for the low income bank classes 1, 3, 5, and 7 (-5.17,
-2.85, -10.92, and -8.63 respectively).

For the high income bank

classes the elasticity of loan demand is not significantly different
from infinity.
The es timates of the elasticities of deposit supply are all very
small .

lbwever, for classes 2, 7, and 8 the estimates are not signifi-

cantly different from infinity.
are all less than one.

The estimates in the other five classes

These consistently low estimates of the elas-

ticity of time deposit supply are to be regarded as questionable.
inelastic supply may mean that . the bank has monopsony power.
however, another plausible explanation.

The

There is,

That is, that regulation Q is

i n effect putting a ceiling on the rate of interest paid on time deposits.

If this is the case the bank will act as if its supply of de-

posit s is perfectly inelastic and the rate paid will be the maxinrum
rate.

The bank will be unable to attract more funds by paying a

higher rate.

The only way the bank could pay a higher rate would be

to change the maturity mix of

its deposits, and this would not

necessarily attract more deposits.
The period 1970 was

chosen for the sample due to the relatively

stable interest rates during the year .
interest rates were rising.
falling.

In the early part of the year

In the latter part of the year they were

lt is fairl y clear that regulation Q was an effective
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constraint at the beginning of 1970, since the Federal Reserve deemed
it necessary to raise the maximum rates in January of 1970.

As money -market rates skyrocketed during 1969 , commercial bank

r ates on time deposits r emained at their regulation Q ceilings
and consequently, business and individual savers withdrew subs tant ial amount s of depos its from banks and placed tho se fund s
in other instruments wi th high rates of return. Although
regulation Q ceilings were raised in January 1970, that change
came too late to halt the heavy deposit outflow around the turn
of the year , especially the outflow of large -denomination time
certificates.??

interest rate survey for the las t three months of 19 70 indicates that
78
rates paid on time deposits moved quickly to their new ceiling rates.

An

Eighty-one percent of the banks were paying the ceiling rate on saving
accounts .

Ninety -seven percent of the banks were paying the ceiling

rate on t ime account less t han twelve months less than $100,000.
Ninety-one percent of t he banks were paying the ceiling rate on time
accounts of one to two years.

Ninety-five percent of the banks were

paying the ceiling rate on time accounts of more than two years.

Only

for accounts of more than one year and more than $100,000 were a large
number of banks paying l ess than the ceiling rate.
First difference analysis
In order to focus on the current rat e of interest the first differ ence of equation system (40) can be taken.

Interest rates calcu -

lated by dividing interest earned on the cl ass of assets by the volume
of the assets are weighted averages of past jnterest rates .

Assuming

that each asset earns its interest annually , the first difference
77 Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Monthly Review (April 1970),
p. 96 .

78 Federa l Reserve Bulletin (April 1971) , p. 375.
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between interest earned in the current year and interest earned in the
previous year is the interest earned on the newly acquired assets .

.4
1. 4
70- 1 69
70

~-4/'A
0

=-o 1

4

(A70 A69)
4 - 4

(41)

69

Yz -yz

When the first difference is taken the constant term drops out.

If the

demand equations are assumed to be stable from year to year at the optimal solution (profit maximization according to the Euler first order
conditions) one would expect the difference between the variables to be
zero.

In order to have a stock adjustment between 1969 and 1970 there

must be a change in the supply and demand functions.

If it is assumed

that there is a trend change in the supply and demand functions, then
there will be a stock adjustment which can be measured in terms of a
modification in equation (41):

(42)

Here

T represents the trend vari able.

It is assumed that this trend

is such that the positions of the supply and demand functions change but
that at the optunal solution the slopes of t he supply and demand functions have not changed.
The first difference anal ysis is made for classes 3, 4, 5, and 6.
In the three methods of measuring assets and liabilities the Fstatistic indicated that equa tion system (40) appeared t o explain more
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than average variation in the endogenous variab les for thes e four cl asses
of banks.

Assets and liabilities are normalized on a per capita basis ,

since the F-statistic is consistently higher using this method than for
the percent of total assets or the average bank data methods.
Table 11 summarizes the r esul t s of two stage least squares estimates of equation (42) using firs t difference of per capita bank data
2
for four classes of banks. The parameter estimates for ar /aL 2 are not
s ignificantly different from zero in any of the bank classes.

This im-

plies that there is no stock adjustment for t ime depo sits, which i s
reasonable since interest rates could be changed within the years time
period for most of the deposits .

Or if regulation

Q is in effect

interest rates won't change , there will be no trend associated with
time deposits.

Based on the F and t -st atistics , the es timates of all

other paramet ers are significantly different from zero.
Table 12 ca lculates the average elas t ici ties for the four bank
classes based on the parameter es timates .

The es timated elasticities

indicate that a monopoly model is of value in analyzing the short run
activities of banks in these classes.

Classes 3, 5, and 6 are essen-

tially rural areas; classes 3 and 5 are low income areas ; cl asses 5 and 6
are low bank density areas; but class 4 is high i ncome , hi gh bank density, nonagricultural, urban area.

It is impossible to es tabli sh any

decisive conclusions on the structural precondi tions fo r the existence
of monopoly power.
Critique of the empirical analysis
In evaluating the empirical evidence presented in this paper two
specific questions should be asked:

Does the empirical evidence support

Table 11.

T"o stage least squares analysis fo r four bank classes using first difference of average
per capita assets and liabilities in the bank marketing area

Bank

class
3

di

4

; .0034 ( .0011 )

5

di

4

; . 0034
(.0008)
dy2 ; .0074
(.0020
di 4 ; .0050 0011 )
dy 2 ; .0069
(.0019)
(

6

di

0

(

0

.0035 dDL
( .0698)

b
.0155 dA4
( . 0063)
b
- .01 44 dA
5
( .0043)

-

,0082 dDL
( .0407 )

b

.0205 dA4
(.0091)
b

- . 0136 dA 5
0066)
(

4

; .0060
(. 0018)
dy2 ; .0053
0013)

2
ar /3 L2

- . 0145 b dA
5
(.0043 )

dy2 ; .0081
(.0015)
4

5
ai ;aA5

4
3i /3A4
a
.0114 dA4
( .0085)

(

+

0

• 0010 dDL
(.0048)

.0314b dA4
0132)

R2

Degrees of
fr eedom

I'

.0906

(1 ,18)

1.794

.4183

(2 ,1 7)

6.113

.2507

(1 ,18 )

6.033

.411 0

(2 '17)

5.930

.1939

(1 ,21)

5.051

.1737

(2,20 )

2.1 03

.1728

(1 '27)

5.641

.14 29

(2,26)

2.167

0

- .oo66b dA 5
0032)
(

0

+

.0116 dDL
( .0417)

aSignificant at the 90 percent level, using the students t-statistic and recognizing that it is only a
proxy for the app ropriate test statistic for simultaneous equations.
bSignificant at e1e 95 percent l evel.

<.0

a-

Table 12.

Average estimated elasticities of demand for state and local fLmds and loans and elastici t y
of time deposi t supply by bank class based on estiwEtes of parameter s using first difference
of per capita assets and liabil ities

State and local funds
Bank
class Estimated Upper a
Lower a
3

4

6

Loans
Upper a

Lower a

-5.38b
-13.5
nr:z:--3.1)

-3.1

-2 .l 3b
n:o,:-1.6)

- 5.8

-1.0

-3. nb

-1.8

-1. 73b
TT.s,="l . 3)

-3 .1

-1.0

- 3.10b
-7 . 0
l-"S"T,- 2 .1)

-1.9

-2 . 30b
"[=4T,-1. 5)

-3.2

-l. 5

-l. 58b

-1. 0

-3 .57b

-5.6

-11.6

~2.7)

5

Estimated

T=T.7," -1. 4)

-8. 1

T="D.9,- 2. 4)

Time de12osits
Es timated
Upper a

Lower a

-5 .31

-13. 7

-3.0

-2.24

-3 .6

-l. 2

21.71

28.6

10. 9

1. 9

.9

~25)

~7)

t:f."/,=)

-2.6

1.33

~

aThe estimated elasticity is calculated by dividing the slope of the demand and supply function into
the ratio of interest rate to volume of the asset or liability for each SEA and averaging for all
SEA's in a bank class. The upper figure is the highest elasticity for an SEA in the banking class
and the lower figure is the lowest elasticity for an SEA in the banking class .
bBased on parameter estimates which the "t-statistic" indicates are significantly different from zero.
cln order to indicate a range of possible elasticity estimates elasticities lvere calculated for values
of the parameter that are one standard deviation above and below the estimated parameter value.
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the theoretical argument of monopoly power?

Does the empirical evidence

indicate that monopoly and monopsony power are of importance in the
conunercial banking industry?
In answer to the first ques t ion, the theoretical model is based
on the profit maximizing mo tives of conunercial bankers .

Asked the

question, "Do bankers maximize profits?", a banker , would probably
answer t hat they maximize ser vice to the community and in that process
they may or may not maximize profits.

"Do they act as if they are

maximizing profits?" is ar. empirical question .

"Is the service to the

conununity that they maximize a function of the constraints of regulation?" is al so an empirical ques tion.

All the estimations explain

less than half of the total variation of the endogenous var i ables.

One

possible explanation is that bankers do not operate as profit maximizers.
There is another more serious criticism of the theoretical model,
and that is that the cal cul us of the Eul er first order conditions is
only defined where the functions are conti nuous.

The existence of

i nequality constraints, that are operative (e .g. r egul at ion Q or
regulation H) if they are incorporated into the objective function may
create a mathematical progranuning problem, rather than a problem of
classical optimization .
The t heoretical model also encounters problems with the appropriate definition of the interest rate.

The interest rate used i s a

weighted average of all past interest rates.
the weighted averages i s the current rate.

The first difference of
The problem with this

approach is that the maturity mix of asset and liability ca t egories
differs, and the adjustment of dlfferent cat egories to current market
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rates will proceed at different paces.

Under these conditions a dynamic

stock-flow model would be more appropriated than the static stock model
utilized in this paper.

However, the data necessary on the maturity mix

of bank portfolios is not available.
Realizing the limitations of the theoretical model, does the
empirical evidence indicate that monopoly power is a relevant consideration in the commercial banking industry?

The answer to this question

has to be mitigated in light of the data source used in the empirical
analysis.

Aggregated bank data, while the best available source for a

cross sectional study is full of all sorts of "noise."

Individual bank

data would have been more appropriate for the study.

In spite of the

weaknesses of the data some conclusions can be drawn.

Table 10 indi-

cated that the elasticity of loan demand in low income areas was substrultially below those in high income areas.

Table 12 indicated that

in four bank classes the adjustment for interest rate changes from year
to year appears to be stmject to some degree of monopoly power.

Due to

the possible incursion of regulation Q into the analysis, no conclusions
can be drawn with respect to the existence of monopsony power.
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CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
'fhe commercial banking industry is often criticized on the grounds
that there is a high concentration of market power in the hands of a
few firms.

However, the appropriate measure of market power is Lerner's

index of monopoly power, not concentration.

Lerner's index measures the

difference between marginal cost and price as a percentage of the price.
On the assumption that firms are profit maximizers (marginal costs equals

marginal revenue) the index is the inverse of the elasticity of demand:
the higher the elasticity of demand, the lower the index of monopoly
power.

The theoretical model developed in the paper is designed to per-

mit the estimation of demand elasticities in the banking industry.
The theoretical model assumes that banks are profit maximizers.
In his efforts to maximize profits the banker considers the cost of maintaining and administering different assets (Cj(Aj)) and liabilities

(Ck(~)) , the risk of default on different assets (DRj), transaction
costs and market risks associated with deposit liability fluctuations
(TrCj), the average and marginal revenue associated with each assets
j

(i Aj)' and the average and marginal cost associated with each
k

liability (r Lk).
n
E(P)

l~

j~l

The banker maximizes an expected profits function:
.

(E(iJA) - E(Cj (A.)) - E(DR.) - E(TrC.))
J
J
J
J
( 43)
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where the expected values are based on the random variation of deposits
and/or l oans .

The expected profits function is maximized sub ject to

the constraint that assets equal liabil i ties plus net worth.

The bank

adjusts its portfolio of assets and issues of liabilities in accordance
with the Eul er first order maximization conditions of the expected
profits f unction.

The Euler first order conditions specify the slopes of

the asset demand functions and the liabil ity supply functions.
The empi ri cal model focuses its attention on the demand and supply
conditions.

Specifically , two

assets (loans and state and loca l funds)

and one liability (time deposits) are investigated.

The prices of all

other assets and liabilities are assumed to be determined in perfectly
compet i t ive markets.

If the elasticity of demand for loans or for state

and local funds is low, the bank is said to have monopoly power .

If

the elasticity of time deposit supply is low, the bank is said to have
monopsony power.

In order t o estimate these elasticities, it is neces-

sary to make several simplifying assumptions:

administrative cos t s are

expressed as a proportion of total assets; default risks are ignored;
and at the optimal solution of the Euler first order conditions transaction costs generated by deposit -l iability fluctuations are treated as
scalars.

HPJ

The empirical expected profits function is :
n

m

>:

'.
'·

j=l

k=l

r kL k

c:c

n
r. 1\.)
j =I J

E(TrC)

( 44)

The liul er first order maximi za tion conditions of the above function dietates a set of behavi.oral equa ti ons for the profi t maximizing bank.
1hese behavi oral equations C3n be used to

esti~ate

the slope of the loan
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demand, the slope of the demand for state and local funds , and the slope
of the time deposit suppl y function, which in turn can be used to estimate the elasticities of the r especti ve functions.
The empirical results are based on cross-sectional data for 289
s tandard economic areas in those states where there is an absence of extensive branch banking.

These observations are categorized into eight

bank classes by per capita income level, by bank density per capita in
the s tandard economic area , and by economic base (agricultural or nonagricultural) of t he area.

Thi s classification groups banks with similar

market conditi ons together .

It is assumed that banks experiencing simi-

lar market condi tions will have identical demand and supply functions.
The Euler first order condi t ions are used to estimate the slopes of the
supply and derrand functions within each class of banks .

The slope esti-

mates are then used to calculate an average elasticity for loan

den~nd,

state and local funds demand, and time deposit supply for each class of
banks.
In general, it can be concluded that those banks from low income
areas have a lower elasticity of demand for loans than banks in high
income areas.

Table 10 gives the range of the estimates of loan demand

elasticity in low income areas from -2.84 to -10.82; th e range of th e
estimates for the high income areas is from -12.83 to

oo.

Banks in lower

income areas have more monopoly power in the loan account.
The elasticity associated with st ate and local funds is relatively
high approximating a perfectly competitive market.
mated elasticities i s from -8.24 t o

oo.

The range of es ti -

For only one bank class (non -

agricultural, high bank densit y, and high income) i s the abso lute va lue
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of the elasticity l ess than 10.

All other dasses of banks have esti-

mates elasticities that would have to be considered consistent with
perfectly competitive markets.
The estimates of the elasticity of deposit supply is low for all
classes of banks .

For six classes of banks it is less than 1.

This

could be due to monopsony power, but it is more likely due to the legal
ceiling on interest rates paid on time deposits (regulation Q).
The data for t wo classes of banks do not appear t o be consistent
with the

en~irical

rrodel of monopoly power.

The class of banks repre-

senting nonagricultural areas with high income and high bank density
per capita, which include s the major urban areas of the country, does
not appear to exhibit a measurable degree of monopoly or monopsony
power.

Also, the rural class of banks from agricultural areas with

high bank density and hi gh income does not appear to exhibit any measurable degree of monopoly or monopsony power.

One would not expect to

f ind monopoly power i n either of these classes.

In the former, even

though bank density is low, financial markets are well developed and communication among customers is good leading one to expect a perfectly
competitive market.

In the l atter bank class, the high

incorr~

and high

bank density would l ead one t o expect the perfectly competitive market,
even though the area is rural .
For selected bank classes a first difference analysis i s made of
the Euler first order conditions .

This is done in an effort to isolate

the current market rate of mterest from past rates of interest.

Inter-

est rates calculated by dividing interest earned by the volume of an
asset in the portfolio arc weighted averages of past interest rates.
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The first difference between any two years reflects the current interest
rates in those years.

This analysis did not indicate the presence of

monopsony power and it is consistent with the implications of regulation

Q. Monopoly power appears to be present especially in the loan account
where t he range of estimated elasticities is from -1.73 to -3.57.

The

conclusion can be drawn that in the short run customers are reluctant
or unabl e to switch banks.

For a year to year change the bank exerts

monopoly power over its loan demand.
the short run.

This conclusion can only apply to

Over the longer period customers may have more alterna-

tives open to them.

This analysis of first difference does not lead to

any conclusions for the structural preconditions for the existence of
monopoly power, but it does indicate that banks in certain markets may
have some degree of monopoly power.
A monopol y model of bank behavior explains some of the portfolio
decisions of some banks .
the behavior of all banks.

However, it i s not appropriate f or studying
Banks in well developed urban financial

market s or rural markets with high income and high bank density are
characterized by perfect competition.

In other markets a monopoly

model is useful in i nterpreting bank behavior .
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